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The 1941 Atlantic Charter’s references to self-determination galvanized
anticolonial nationalists during the Second World War. These activists used the
principles enumerated in the Atlantic Charter to frame their demands. This thesis
examines three cases in the broader global context during the war, from vastly different
colonial and wartime situations: British-ruled India, French-ruled Syria, and the U.S.ruled Philippines. Across these different situations, anticolonial nationalists used the
Atlantic Charter in an attempt to legitimate their own projects.
This thesis shows that the elite nationalist movements examined here used a
common rhetoric from the Charter, but in variable ways. Each case study is examined in
depth, concluding with comparisons of how Indian, Syrian, and Philippine nationalist
movements cited, used, or ignored the Atlantic Charter. Broadly speaking, movements
in each of the case studies diverged between either dismissing the Charter as colonialist
hypocrisy, necessitating the rejection of political dialogue for more radical options, or
using the Charter as a tool to extract concessions from European and American colonial
regimes.
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Chapter One
The Atlantic Charter in Anticolonial Perspective: Historiography and Theory

On August 14, 1941, during a summit off Newfoundland, U.S. President
Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a joint
statement that surprised the world.1 The statement’s eight points described the broad
areas of Churchill and Roosevelt’s agreement over the post-war world, the “common
principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their
hopes for a better future for the world.” Included were traditional U.S. points about free
trade and freedom of the seas, as well as more New Deal-inspired goals of “improved
labor standards…and social security.”2 On the 14th the document appeared as a press
release in the United States, while in London Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee
read it to a worldwide BBC radio audience.3 The document quickly became known as
the “Atlantic Charter.”4
The Allies continued to reference the Charter in their documents throughout the
war. Shortly after its promulgation, Britain and its European allies affirmed the Atlantic
Charter as the basis for their opposition to Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.5 After the
Japanese, German, and Italian declarations of war on the United States, President

1

For an overview of the negotiations of the Charter, see Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit:
Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941, Revised Edition (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1991), 32, 89, 93, and 149ff.; Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of
the U.N. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1997), 36–40.
2
“Atlantic Charter,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed April 8,
2013, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.
3
“Mr. Attlee’s Statement,” The Times, August 15, 1941.
4
Wilson, The First Summit, 192; Elizabeth Borgwardt, “When You State a Moral Principle, You Are
Stuck with It: The 1941 Atlantic Charter as a Human Rights Instrument,” Virginia Journal of
International Law 46, no. 3 (2006): 501–502.
5
“Inter-Allied Council Statement on the Principles of the Atlantic Charter: September 24, 1941,” Text,
The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed December 11, 2013,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/interall.asp.
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Roosevelt joined Churchill in promulgating a “Declaration by United Nations” to serve
as the basis for the anti-Axis alliance.6 The signatory states to the Declaration were then
referred to as the “United Nations.” At the end of the war, the signatories participated in
the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and
thus became the founding members of the United Nations Organization.7
The third point in the Atlantic Charter aroused the most interest globally: that the
United States and the United Kingdom “respect the right of all peoples to choose the
form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights
and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”8 As
Roosevelt speechwriter Robert Sherwood observed, “it was not long before the people
of India, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia were beginning to ask if the Atlantic Charter
extended also to the Pacific and to Asia in general.”9 Over the course of the war,
Sherwood’s comments proved too limiting. Indians, Burmese, Indonesians, and
Malaysians did appeal to it, but wartime appeals to the Atlantic Charter by anticolonial
nationalists spanned the entire globe. A brief sampling from the secondary literature
indicates that anticolonial nationalists from Asia, Africa, and the Americas all appealed
to the Charter. In sub-Saharan Africa, literature indicates that anticolonial nationalists in

“Declaration by the United Nations, January 1, 1942,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History
and Diplomacy, accessed December 11, 2013, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp.
7
Article 1, section 2(a), “Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference,” The Avalon Project:
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed December 11, 2013,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp. A few neutral nations, such as Turkey, joined the conference
and the UNO without signing the Declaration, cf. Article 1, section 2(b).
8
Point Three, “Atlantic Charter.”
9
Robert Sherwood, quoted in Borgwardt, “When You State a Moral Principle, You Are Stuck with It,”
527–528.
6
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South Africa,10 Southern Rhodesia,11 Northern Rhodesia,12 Madagascar,13 Kenya,14 and
Nigeria15 all appealed to the Atlantic Charter during the War. Nationalists in Tunisia16
and Algeria,17 activists in Iraq,18 as well as officials in Iran19 cited the Atlantic Charter.
Likewise in the Americas, anticolonialists in the West Indies20 along with prodemocracy activists in Guatemala and El Salvador.21 In the United States, AfricanAmerican activists used the Charter to engage with, appeal to, and critique the U.S.
government during the war years.22

Saul Dubow, “South Africa and South Africans: Nationality, Belonging, Citizenship,” in The
Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson, vol. 2, 18851994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 52.
11
Michael O. West, “Ndabaningi Sithole, Garfield Todd and the Dadaya School Strike of 1947,” Journal
of Southern African Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1992): 299.
12
Rosaleen Smyth, “War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia,” African
Affairs 83, no. 332 (July 1984): 356–358. Smyth’s work is exemplary for enumerating numerous
perspectives on the Charter, rather than simply noting its citation.
13
Douglas Little, “Cold War and Colonialism in Africa: The United States, France, and the Madagascar
Revolt of 1947,” Pacific Historical Review 59, no. 4 (November 1990): 533 and 535.
14
Fay Gadsden, “The African Press in Kenya, 1945-1952,” The Journal of African History 21, no. 4
(January 1980): 520; Fay Gadsden, “Wartime Propaganda in Kenya: The Kenya Information Office, 19391945,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 19, no. 3 (January 1986): 419.
15
John Flint, “Planned Decolonization and Its Failure in British Africa,” African Affairs 82, no. 328 (July
1983): 410; Robert Pearce, “The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa,” African Affairs
83, no. 330 (January 1984): 85.
16
Kenneth J. Perkins, “North African Propaganda and the United States, 1946-1956,” African Studies
Review 19, no. 3 (December 1976): 66.
17
Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya
and Algeria, trans. Dona Geyer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 24–25.
18
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old
Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba`thists, and Free Officers (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1978), 524.
19
F. Eshraghi, “The Immediate Aftermath of Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941,” Middle
Eastern Studies 20, no. 3 (July 1984): 343.
20
Tony Martin, “Eric Williams and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission: Trinidad’s Future
Nationalist Leader as Aspiring Imperial Bureaucrat, 1942-1944,” The Journal of African American
History 88, no. 3 (July 2003): 285.
21
Peter Calvert, “Demilitarisation in Latin America,” Third World Quarterly 7, no. 1 (January 1985): 35;
Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 23.
22
Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 93, 110–111, 123, and 164; Penny M. Von Eschen,
Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 25–28; Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American
Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 16–17; Nico
10
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However, the scholars cited here only mention the appearance of the Atlantic
Charter within individual national narratives. Other scholars dealing with global
narratives have briefly noted the global efflorescence of anticolonial use of the Charter,
but they have not explored it in any depth. This thesis will attempt to fill the gap
between these two tendencies. In this, it follows the methodology of Erez Manela’s The
Wilsonian Moment, which analyzed the worldwide movements for self-determination
emerging around Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic statements in 1918-1919.
Acknowledging that appeals to Wilson’s self-determination came from almost
everywhere, Manela chose four countries to examine in depth. In like manner, this thesis
will examine Atlantic Charter-talk in three case studies: India, Syria, and the
Philippines. In so doing, I hope like Manela “to combine fine-grained detail with a broad
perspective.”23
The Atlantic Charter has spanned a sizable literature, but none of it has examined
how anticolonialists used the Charter. This opening will address the historiography of
the Atlantic Charter. Then, it will introduce a theoretical background for how
anticolonial nationalists mobilized against colonial powers by using documents such as
the Charter. This background will then inform the three case studies. As the survey of
literature above shows, the Atlantic Charter provided a rhetorical space in which
anticolonial nationalists could call attention to the hypocrisy of the Allied war effort.
Despite their attempts to limit its application, U.S. and British policymakers could not

Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 131–133.
23
Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial
Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8.
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stop the peoples within their own empires from exploiting their own rhetoric against
empire.
The Atlantic Charter has already engaged many scholars in useful questions
concerning diplomatic history, international law, and human rights. However, few have
considered how activists among the residents of Euro-American empires applied the
words to themselves. Anticolonial theory offers some useful reflections for such a study,
noting the limitations and possibilities from such tactics. Notably, these tactics often
originated in elite leaders, and so a study of those tactics needs to acknowledge that
limitation. This thesis seeks to study political movements for self-determination and
anticolonialism in a global lens through filling the non-Western hole in Atlantic Charter
historiography.
The three case studies will be limited, and may not prove to be representative.
Comparison will help to screen out some faulty generalizations, but future research will
need to be done on nuances in mobilization, indifference to the Charter, and more
subaltern and gendered analyses of the Charter and self-determination in general. This
thesis hopes simply to start a conversation, asking the question: how did anticolonialists
use the Atlantic Charter?

Terminology
Like any study of colonialism, this project faces problems of slippery
terminology. Both in the 1940s and today the terms “colonialism” and “imperialism”
have become synonymous. The conflation of these words obscures their distinctive and
important meanings. Imperialism, in particular, can refer to a Leninist theoretical model
5

or to a special sort of colonialism (or vice versa).24 For the period under consideration,
both terms came to refer to European, U.S., and Japanese rule over overseas polities.
These “metropoles” claimed sovereignty over these territories, often “un-forming or reforming the communities that existed there already,” or at least attempting to do so.25
Since both terms have described these phenomena, this thesis will use “colonialism” as a
catch-all.
The conflation of “colonialism” and “imperialism” even in scholarly usage
becomes apparent when we seek to name movements that opposed those phenomena.
Historians and contemporaries have almost always dubbed these movements
“anticolonial,” or “anticolonialist,” even if they contested “imperialist” processes. “Antiimperialism” has none of the currency of “anticolonialism.” Therefore, in order to be
clear about what “anticolonial” refers to, I will use “colonial” to describe the processes
of overseas political domination confronted by those “anticolonialists.” I do not suggest
“anticolonialism” as a unified ideology, but instead as a placeholder for a wide variety
of political methods opposing colonialism. As Ania Loomba notes with the equally
evasive term “postcolonialism,” terms like colonialism, imperialism, and anticolonialism
are useful “only if we use [them] with caution and qualifications.” In this they are
comparable to “patriarchy,” operating as “a useful shorthand for conveying a

24

To illustrate the problem, two works from the same year hold two opposite delineations of
colonialism/imperialism: compare Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 2nd ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2005), 11–12; Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, trans. Shelley L.
Frisch, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), 21–22.
25
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 8. Emphasis in original.
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relationship…that is, in practice, highly variable because it always works alongside
other social structures.”26
“Anticolonialist” also leaves enough room to include figures whose ideologies
did not fit neatly as “nationalists.” However, many of the figures cited in this thesis will
qualify as “anticolonial nationalists.” Benedict Anderson’s canonical Imagined
Communities forms the basis for this thesis’s understanding of nationalism. Hence,
many nationalist movements profiled here sought to form future states which would be
isomorphic with the colonial territory, seeking to forge together multiethnic populations
under a new postcolonial identity.27 The shape of the colonial polity framed the debates
over self-determination that the Atlantic Charter’s third clause prompted, helping to
identify the “selves” for whom activists sought self-determination. In each of the case
studies, other actors contested these conceptions, such as the Pakistan movement in
British India and Greater Syrianists or pan-Arab nationalists in French-mandated Syria.
This thesis will only scratch the surface of the complex dynamics involved in
representing and contesting those selves.
By self-determination, this thesis refers to the form specified, in my
interpretation, by the Atlantic Charter: self-determination incorporating both
independence and democratic governance. The ambiguity of the slogan “selfdetermination” leaves these questions vague, such that “national self-determination” can
refer to “a French government in France” or “an elected government in France,” or a

26

Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 21.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,
revised edition (New York: Verso, 1991), 114–115; on the Spanish creole model for this, cf. 52 and 57.
27
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combination.28 Thankfully, the Charter’s third point actually delineated certain political
conditions, which contemporaries then referred to as “self-determination,” harkening
back to the Wilsonian and Leninist concept. Hence, self-determination here will refer to
“the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live,”
including the restoration of “sovereign rights and self government…to those who have
been forcibly deprived of them.”29 Naturally, this leaves many questions (what
constitutes a “people”?, how shall the choice be made?, what are “sovereign rights and
self-government”?), but these will form the boundaries for the questions this thesis shall
examine. The questions excite contestations in the past and present.

Historiography
Scholarly literature about the Atlantic Charter has come in a few discrete lines of
inquiry. Diplomatic history has focused on the facts of Roosevelt and Churchill’s 1941
meeting, the production of the Charter, and its place in wartime inter-Allied politics.
Other more diffuse thematic lines have placed the Atlantic Charter within the context of
wartime and postwar international law and human rights. More recent historical work
broadened the inquiry into wartime human rights and international law, and so this thesis
will seek to situate anticolonial uses of the Charter into that new work.
Theodore Wilson’s 1969 reconstruction of the Atlantic Conference remains the
definitive account of the events which produced the Charter. Wilson included a blowby-blow account of the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, describing the back-and-forth
Benyamin Neuberger, “National Self-Determination: Dilemmas of a Concept,” Nations and
Nationalism 1, no. 3 (1995): 300. Neuberger explores theoretically many of the issues brought up by these
terms.
29
Point Three, “Atlantic Charter.”
28
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between Roosevelt and Churchill.30 Most of the discussion concerned the issue of free
trade, eventually covered in the Charter’s fourth point. This line of inquiry has resulted
in studies focusing on Euro-American political economy and the narrow diplomatic
history of the Charter’s production.31
Using Wilson’s account, a second generation of diplomatic historians integrated
the Charter into their narratives about the Anglo-American wartime relationship. David
Reynolds particularly brought out how the Atlantic Charter proved a flop in Britain, with
Britons disappointed in a mere declaration of principles and not a declaration of war.32
Christopher Thorne, Roger Louis, and John Sbrega all analyzed at length the high-level
Anglo-American differences over colonialism, particularly concerning the British
Empire in the war theaters of Southeast Asia and India.33 U.S. authors who focused on
Roosevelt’s personal leadership formed a counterpart to these analysts.34 Townsend
Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley also discuss the Atlantic Charter as an episode in the
30

Wilson, The First Summit, 159–178.
Alan P. Dobson, “Economic Diplomacy at the Atlantic Conference,” Review of International Studies
10, no. 2 (April 1984): 143–63; L. S. Pressnell and Sheila V. Hopkins, “A Canard out of Time? Churchill,
the War Cabinet, and the Atlantic Charter, August 1941,” Review of International Studies 14, no. 3 (July
1988): 223–35.
32
David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 214, 258–259; he then emphasized this point in David
Reynolds, “The Atlantic ‘Flop’: British Foreign Policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt Meeting of August
1941,” in The Atlantic Charter, ed. Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1994), 129–50.
33
Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 19411945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 160–162, 209–212, among others; Wm. Roger Louis,
Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978); John J. Sbrega, Anglo-American Relations and Colonialism in East
Asia, 1941-1945 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983).
34
Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt,”
Political Science Quarterly 70, no. 1 (March 1955): 1–18; John J. Sbrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 1 (January 1986): 65–84;
Fred E. Pollock and Warren F. Kimball, “‘In Search of Monsters to Destroy’: Roosevelt and Colonialism,”
in The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman, by Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 127–58; on the Atlantic Charter specifically, cf. Warren F. Kimball,
“The Atlantic Charter: ‘With All Deliberate Speed,’” in The Atlantic Charter, ed. Douglas Brinkley and
David R. Facey-Crowther (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 83–114.
31
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wartime rise of the United Nations Organization.35 Indian historian M.S.
Venkataramani’s caustic revision of these scholars’ sympathetic treatment of Roosevelt
offers a useful foil, since he doubts Roosevelt’s personal anticolonialism where other
scholars do not.36 However, all of these analyses center on U.S. and British officials’
discussions of colonialism and ignore other levels of discourse.
International law and human rights comprise the other thematic line of writing
about the Atlantic Charter. The late Belizean diplomat Edward Laing served as the point
of intersection for these themes. Laing produced three articles valorizing the Atlantic
Charter. He argued that it served as the impetus for the postwar “norm of selfdetermination,” which would place the Charter at the center of a legal history of
anticolonial self-determination.37 He also positioned the Charter as the legal progenitor
of postwar global individual human rights.38 Elizabeth Borgwardt has continued Laing’s
argument about the Charter as a human rights document, while largely neglecting his
focus on its contribution to self-determination.39
Like Borgwardt and Laing, historians of human rights have noted the Atlantic
Charter’s references to individual rights.40 These references come in its sixth point,

35

Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N., 36–40 and 46.
M.S. Venkataramani, “The United States, the Colonial Issue, and the Atlantic Charter Hoax,”
International Studies 13, no. 1 (January 1974): 1–28.
37
Edward A. Laing, “The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991,” California Western International
Law Journal 22, no. 2 (1992): 209–308.
38
Edward A. Laing, “Relevance of the Atlantic Charter for a New World Order,” Indian Journal of
International Law 29, no. 3/4 (December 1989): 298–325; Edward A. Laing, “The Contribution of the
Atlantic Charter to Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Universalism,” Willamette Law Review 26
(1989): 113–70.
39
Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Borgwardt, “When You State a Moral Principle,
You Are Stuck with It.”
40
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, Third Edition
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 140; Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of
Human Rights, 1933-1950,” The Historical Journal 47, no. 2 (June 2004): 385.
36
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which refers to establishing “a peace…which will afford assurance that all the men in all
lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”41 This referred back to
President Roosevelt’s January 6, 1941, State of the Union address, which referred to
securing “four essential human freedoms,” including the freedoms from want and fear.42
Addressing an independent, domestic audience, Roosevelt made no mention of selfdetermination. The Charter’s third point, which referred to self-determination, does not
contain any reference to individual rights per se. Therefore, the historians who position
the Atlantic Charter in the history of human rights conflate separate portions of the
document: its references to self-determination and its references to individual rights.
Like Elizabeth Borgwardt, these historians highlight the Charter’s individual rights
clauses while neglecting its self-determination clauses.
The conflation becomes more important because the same authors who highlight
the Atlantic Charter’s contribution to individual human rights also tend to include
anticolonialism as a human rights cause. This has become a fault-line in the burgeoning
historiography of human rights. Authors such as Brian Simpson, Reza Afshari, Jan
Eckel, and Samuel Moyn critique writers such as Paul Gordon Lauren for referring to
anticolonialism as a human rights movement. Since writers such as Moyn conceive of
human rights as individual rights, they point out that anticolonialism contests the
management of the state, rather than protecting individuals from the state.43

Point Six, “Atlantic Charter.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1941”
(Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project), accessed December 8, 2013,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16092.
43
A.W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European
Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 300; Reza Afshari, “On Historiography of
Human Rights Reflections on Paul Gordon Lauren’s ‘The Evolution of International Human Rights:
Visions Seen,’” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 1 (February 2007): 50; Jan Eckel, “Human Rights and
41
42
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In attacking the inclusion of anticolonialism as a human rights issue, these critics
center on the Atlantic Charter. Brian Simpson points out that Borgwardt and Lauren
accept at face value wartime rhetoric which “tended to assimilate the ‘Four Freedoms’
speech with [the Atlantic Charter].”44 That is, their references to the Charter as an
individual rights document really draw more on the Four Freedoms speech. In defense of
these authors, Roosevelt himself conflated the two repeatedly, referring to the Four
Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter in the same breath on multiple occasions.45 However,
the critics are right to point out that the Atlantic Charter generated worldwide interest for
its references to self-determination, not to human rights. In so doing, the critics point out
the gap in the historiography on the Atlantic Charter which this thesis seeks to fill.

Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human
Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 1, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 114–115; Samuel Moyn, The Last
Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2010), 87–88; Samuel Moyn, “Imperialism, Self-Determination, and the Rise of Human Rights,” in The
Human Rights Revolution: An International History, ed. Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I.
Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 162.
44
Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, 175.
45
Roosevelt’s speech to the International Student Assembly in September 1942 also distanced these
objectives from achievability: “In the concept of the four freedoms, in the basic principles of the Atlantic
Charter, we have set for ourselves high goals, unlimited objectives.” Later in the same speech, he paired
the two again as twin slogans, referring to them as “the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter”: Franklin
D. Roosevelt, “Address to the International Student Assembly, September 3, 1942” (Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project), accessed December 8, 2013,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16300. Roosevelt performed a similar pairing in his 1943 speech
in Ottawa: Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address at Ottawa, Canada, August 25, 1943” (Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project), accessed December 8, 2013,
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The human rights historians in both camps do agree that the Atlantic Charter
prompted a global outpouring of interest in self-determination.46 The scholars critical of
reading the Atlantic Charter into human rights history affirm this global efflorescence as
evidence that contemporary observers saw self-determination, not human rights, in the
Charter.47 From my reading, their critique offers a useful corrective to the uneasy
amalgamation of self-determination with individual rights in Borgwardt’s work.
However, the critique goes too far by assuming that contemporary readings of the
Charter preclude later appropriations of the Charter for different purposes. As we shall
see, individuals and groups appropriated the Atlantic Charter in a variety of ways that
went against its authors’ original intentions.
Human rights historiography has often drawn attention to oppressed peoples
appropriating the legal codes of their dominators. Anticolonialists’ use of the Charter,
promulgated by colonial powers, fit into this pattern. Moyn summarizes this pattern as
“tales…told of seizures from below of the formal universalisms of dominant peoples,
classes, and nations.”48 For example, Bonny Ibhawoh’s 2007 study tells of Nigerian
appeals to British law and then to universal rights-talk in pursuit of varied aims.
Ibhawoh singles out the Atlantic Charter as “an important part of the nationalist
rhetoric” and acknowledges that “public discussion over the charter centered on its
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famous third clause,” that on self-determination.49 Roland Burke’s 2010 study centers on
African and Asian diplomatic contributions to human rights, particularly in the United
Nations. He presents newly independent states’ diplomats arguing for universal human
rights and articulating a universal right to self-determination in the 1950s.50 Burke
highlights the contributions of non-Western figures, but he does so only for the postwar
era. Ibhawoh notices the importance of the Atlantic Charter, but his wide-ranging focus
only permits a few comments on it. This thesis, then, seeks to draw attention to the many
activists who used similar arguments during the war, arguing for the global application
of the right to self-determination.
Whether one considers the right to self-determination a human right or not, the
historiography of human rights has certainly affirmed the importance of selfdetermination discourse for anticolonialism. Moreover, it has shown the importance of
the Atlantic Charter for that discourse. Of all the authors critical of Borgwardt, Moyn
lays greatest stress upon the importance of the Atlantic Charter – for self-determination,
rather than human rights. He even claims that the Charter “powerfully reanimated…the
promise of self-determination.”51 Sadly, a broader historiography of self-determination
itself cannot be found. As Brad Simpson wrote recently, “few historians have offered
sustained treatments of self-determination as a dynamic force in international politics,
exploring specific moments or episodes rather than examining self-determination’s
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contested meaning over time.”52 This thesis will not fill that gap, which must await
Simpson’s forthcoming book.
However, this thesis will contribute one more “specific moment or episode”
which a longer survey could piece together with others. This thesis will help fill the gap
between the Wilsonian moment of the 1920s, identified by Erez Manela, and what Moyn
characterizes as the Wilsonian moment’s “second, more successful chance after World
War II.”53 Burke shows the critical role that non-Western actors played in making the
second Wilsonian moment more successful for self-determination, but remains silent on
how self-determination re-emerged in global discourse. This thesis will tell the story of
the beginning of that second Wilsonian moment.
In that sense, this work also builds on the research of Marika Sherwood. Her
excellent articles have looked at how African anticolonial activists used the Atlantic
Charter and pressured the United Nations alliance to honor its promises, particularly at
the San Francisco Conference.54 However, her work only deals with African and AfroCaribbean groups, and on the Atlantic Charter she restricts her lens to groups active in
the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, she establishes an excellent groundwork for
discussing anticolonial mobilization of the Charter.
Like Sherwood’s work on the Atlantic Charter, this thesis focuses on what
people did with the Charter. Whatever the Charter’s authors intended, their
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“efforts…would not be so much passively received as actively transformed,” and the
Charter “took on a life of [its] own.”55 Regarding the Charter’s promise of selfdetermination, “anticolonial activists did not wait to find out if Roosevelt meant what he
said and seized the charter’s promises of self-rule to describe and lend legitimacy to
their ongoing struggles.”56 This thesis will look at how three movements of anticolonial
activists “seized the charter’s promises.”
Just as Manela used case studies to bridge the local and the global, this thesis
will also heed the advice of the late Kenneth Cmiel and use its three case studies to
attend “to the nuances of political language in different cultural settings.”57 Brad
Simpson sees the same need for global and transnational analysis in the context of selfdetermination, in order “to treat self-determination as part of both global and [local]
politics.”58 In as much as this thesis honors these commitments, it fits into the recent
turn toward transnationalism. Particularly, it honors the trend toward “placing of the
non-western world at the centre rather than the periphery of the nexus of transnational
forces that shaped the mid-twentieth century.”59
Doing so, however, goes against the intentions of the Atlantic Charter’s chief
interpreter. Winston Churchill, in his radio address on returning from his Conference
“somewhere in the Atlantic,” proclaimed that he and Roosevelt had taken up “the
guidance of the fortunes of the broad, toiling masses in all the continents…to lead them
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forward out of the miseries into which they have been plunged back to the broad highroad of freedom and justice.”60 Churchill intended to dictate the route toward freedom
and justice. This thesis will show, though, that many of the “broad, toiling masses in all
the continents” did not intend to follow Churchill’s lead. As with Woodrow Wilson’s
attempt to shape the postwar world in 1918, the Atlantic Charter “acquired meanings in
the colonies that Churchill had not foreseen.”61 Anticolonial activists charted out their
own broad high-roads of freedom and justice, ones which Churchill never intended to
lay out for them.

The Charter in Anticolonial Perspective
Debates about the Atlantic Charter during the war found echoes in the ironies
identified by postwar anticolonial theorists. Critiquing the idea that the Allies fought
against colonialism in the War, authors such as Aimé Césaire, Albert Memmi, and
Frantz Fanon turned their attention to the parallels between Allied and Nazi colonial
rule. Jean-Paul Sartre’s anticolonial writings also contribute important insights.
Likewise, during the war, debates about the Atlantic Charter centered on whether it
applied to the Axis empires alone or to Allied empires also. The question of
comparability aligned closely to the question of applicability of the Charter.
The question of the applicability of the Charter emerged almost as soon as its
promulgation. Clement Attlee addressed this issue as he spoke to West African students,
one day after reading the Charter for the absent Churchill. On August 15, he told the
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61
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students that “you will find [the Atlantic Charter] principles will apply, I believe, to all
the peoples of the world.”62 Such a possibility aroused nationalists from around the
world. If the Charter’s third point applied to colonies, colonized populations could
choose their own form of government (independence) and have their sovereign rights
restored after having been forcibly deprived of them (by Allied colonial powers). As
Lloyd Gardner noted, “even the first press reports of the [Atlantic] conference…raised
questions of universal applicability.”63
Anticolonial appeals to the Atlantic Charter used the words of the colonizers
against them. The Tunisian analyst Albert Memmi saw this as a longstanding
anticolonial technique, that of using “the very values of the colonizer.”64 In the case of
the Atlantic Charter, two colonial powers had declared their own values, including the
right to self-determination. In appealing to the Charter, then, anticolonialists used the
colonizer’s values. By appealing to the Atlantic Charter, anticolonial activists “only
wanted [Europe] to recognize [their] rights.”65 In this sense, appeals to the Charter
represented a form of assimilationism. That is, anticolonial activists appealed for the
integration of their colonial polities into an Atlantic Charter-based world order, one
which recognized their right to self-determination. Frantz Fanon decried such
assimilationism, arguing that the engagement of elite bourgeois nationalists with the
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colonizing society via its values formed a roadblock to forming true solidarity with the
revolutionary peasantry.66
However, the engagement remained largely one-sided. On September 9, 1941,
Churchill spoke in Parliament to answer the question of whether the Charter indeed
applied to the colonized world. In light of its importance, the speech merits extensive
quotation here:
…At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty,
self-government and national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the
Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any alterations in the territorial boundaries
which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive
evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance
to the British Crown. We have made declarations on these matters which are complete in
themselves, free from ambiguity and related to the conditions and circumstances of the
territories and peoples affected. They will be found to be entirely in harmony with the
high conception of freedom and justice which inspired the Joint Declaration [the
Atlantic Charter].67

Churchill thus suggested that the Atlantic Charter only actually applied to the conquered
lands of Europe. Churchill felt no qualms about maintaining limitations on “the
sovereignty, self-government and national life” of territories under colonial rule. He
rejected the appeals of anticolonialists to the colonizer’s values enumerated in the
Charter.
Postwar anticolonial theorists would have expected nothing different. As Memmi
put it, colonizers could never recognize the application of rights to the colonized.
Instead, colonizers needed to remain the only legitimate actors in an international
system, setting themselves as the “mediator” of that order to the colonized polities.68
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Rights would only apply to “legitimate actors,” who would then mediate those rights to
the colonized. In Churchill’s construction, the Atlantic Charter applied to Europe alone.
That is, an Atlantic Charter-based international system proved coterminous with Europe.
M.S. Venkataramani noticed this in the Atlantic Charter’s reference to “sovereign
rights.” After all, in an imperial conception of international law, only European nations
had truly “sovereign rights,” and indeed “Britain…had ‘sovereign rights’ in India and
Nigeria.”69 Thus, reaffirming sovereignty did no good to anticolonialists when the
sovereignty was that of empires. Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi applied the same logic
to the Declaration by United Nations, whose promise to “uphold ‘sovereign rights and
self-government’…furthermore left open the interpretation of whether sovereign rights
of imperialist nations would continue to trump non-European aspirations for
independence.”70 The postwar environment of continued European colonialism certainly
bore out this interpretation. Churchill’s Atlantic Charter applied only to European
nation-states, the center of his conception of international law. In the words of a British
civil servant of the Raj, “the maxims of international law” only applied to “the relations
of independent and co-equal European States.”71
However, Churchill represented the British Empire as the mediator of selfdetermination to its colonial possessions. He claimed that British “declarations” related
to “the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples
which owe allegiance to the British Crown…will be found to be entirely in harmony
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with the high conception of freedom and justice which inspired the Joint Declaration
[the Atlantic Charter].”72 To concede this, however, left all authority in the hands of the
British government. Given Churchill’s leadership of the “diehards” opposed to the
limited devolution of power to Indians in the 1935 Government of India Act, his conceit
to continuing British power in India came as no surprise.73
Hence, Churchill’s qualification fit into Memmi’s construction of colonizers as
mediators of rights. By insisting on colonial powers mediating the international order to
their colonies, Churchill set up a rights regime which remained “totally extraneous to the
colonized so that he can never avail himself of it.”74 For example, the wartime South
African leader Jan Smuts could simply reject the African National Congress’
appropriation of the Atlantic Charter “as a false reading” of the document.75 Churchill’s
Eurocentric Atlantic Charter-rights regime, in Sartre’s terms, sought for Europeans to
enjoy “democratic rights that the colonialist system refuses to the colonized native.”76
That is, the European nations conquered by the Nazis had the right to enjoy restoration
and self-government, but Asian, African, and Caribbean territories conquered by
European powers had no such rights. To use Partha Chatterjee’s term, Churchill applied
“the rule of colonial difference” to the Atlantic Charter, denying to colonized people the
universality of rights proclaimed in the Charter.77 Like so many other universal rights

72

374 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1941) 68-69.
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1941/sep/09/war-situation (accessed March 8, 2013).
73
Cf. John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 446–448.
74
Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, 58.
75
Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 56.
76
Jean-Paul Sartre, “Introduction,” in The Colonizer and the Colonized, by Albert Memmi, trans.
Lawrence Hoey and Howard Greenfield (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), xxiv.
77
Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993), 10, 16.

21

declarations issued from the West, universalist language only really applied to
Europeans or their descendants.
Roosevelt disagreed rhetorically with Churchill’s interpretation of the Charter. In
his Fireside Chat of February 23, 1942, Roosevelt declared in no uncertain terms that
“the Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic
but to the whole world,” including its provision about “self-determination of Nations
and peoples.”78 However, the disagreement remained merely rhetorical. Roosevelt did
not press for the implementation of the Atlantic Charter. In fact, as inevitable
compromises with the British and the Soviets approached, Roosevelt began to back
away from the Atlantic Charter as an achievable vision.79 Rather, he presented it as an
ideal to strive for in the long term. By late 1944, Roosevelt characterized the Charter as
“an objective” to be achieved in the range of centuries, or even millennia, like “a great
many of the previous pronouncements that go back many centuries [but] have not been
attained yet.”80 Thus, Roosevelt created a rhetorical space in which to escape having to
directly apply the principles of the Charter. To the extent that decolonization proceeded
during the war and after, it came from the efforts of anticolonialists and adjustments in
the international system, not honoring the Atlantic Charter. Largely, “the announced
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principle of the Atlantic Charter, self-determination, is one the Americans decided they
did not have to be stuck with after all.”81
The disagreement in interpretation reminds us that, from its Anglo-American
authors’ perspective, “the Atlantic Charter…was a deeply ambiguous document.”82 On
its face value, though, the Charter had very clear meaning: a universal right to selfdetermination. Despite repeated appeals, “the effort to catch the West with its own moral
language had failed.”83 The failure of the Allies to live up to the Atlantic Charter fit into
a long tradition of Western hypocrisy. As reviewed by Robert Young, “Western
humanism and rights discourse…had worked by excluding a majority of the world’s
population from the category of the human.”84
Hypocrisy of this type formed the basis for many postwar anticolonial theorists’
rejection of making arguments based on Western pronouncements and values. Fanon
observed with disgust that Western discourse is “never done talking of Man” and yet
bases itself on raw violence directed against humans.85 Likewise, Aimé Césaire
condemned European humanistic idealism, which he dubbed “pseudo-humanism,” since
it “has diminished the rights of man” through “sordidly racist” restrictions of their
application to Europeans.86 Césaire would thus likely dismiss the high rhetoric of the
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Atlantic Charter, especially once Churchill restricted its application to the subjugated
peoples of Europe.
Acknowledging these limits on Atlantic Charter rhetoric should not dissuade us
from studying its mobilization by anticolonialists. Even Fanon differentiated between
European hypocrisy and the utility of the ideas they expressed. Fanon acknowledged
that “all the elements of a solution to the great problems of humanity have, at different
times, existed in European thought.”87 Fanon recognized, though, that even by invoking
such values, “we are not so naïve as to think that this will come about with the
cooperation and the good will of the European governments.”88 Instead, the denial of
rights required struggle, whether violent struggle, as Fanon advocated, or nonviolent
struggle, as for many of the movements this thesis addresses. As Memmi noted, the
exclusion of the colonized from universal values depends on the precarious necessity
“that this order not be questioned by others, and especially not by the colonized.”89 The
colonized did not let Churchill’s order go unquestioned.
Benjamin Gregg, a recent theorist of rights claims, valorizes this state of affairs.
He argues that simply to receive rights as pliant and passive subjects reduces those rights
to “gratuitous grants from the powerful,” depriving “their recipients of autonomy and
equality.”90 Instead of seeing themselves as “supernumeraries,” unintended
consequences of universalist language, rights claimants should “self-regard as someone
denied recognition” of an already-possessed right.91 Sartre understood the need for such

87

Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 314.
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 106.
89
Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, 76.
90
Gregg, “Individuals as Authors of Human Rights,” 636.
91
Gregg, “Individuals as Authors of Human Rights,” 637.
88

24

self-assertion, arguing that Europeans could never “grant” colonized people
“independence.” Instead, “each of them [the colonized] has every right, and the right to
everything.”92 The onus for rethinking, then, shifted to the denier of the right – such as
Churchill, seeking to restrict his own universalist language.
The universalist language of the Atlantic Charter invited the colonized to place
themselves within it and hence to question their exclusion.93 After all, “the high-toned
abstractions in the Atlantic Charter” only called attention to the “internal contradictions
and hypocrisies within the democracies themselves,” such as the denial of rights to
colonial territories.94 Recent historians have registered the importance of the Atlantic
Charter not for the fact that it, or its Euro-American authors, beneficently granted
something to the colonized. Rather, the Charter and the controversy around it served a
catalytic purpose, prompting discussion of universal rights.95 Churchill’s defiance did
not deny activists the ability to articulate their claims using rights-talk.
As Andreas Eckert and Ibhawoh’s analyses of Nigeria seem to show, European
rejection of rights claims prompted a reaction against the legitimacy of empire. Fanon
preferred that reaction to come in violent guerrilla uprisings, but even using nonviolent
methods anticolonial movements could reject the assimilationism promised by the
Atlantic Charter. As Sartre prophesied, “the excluded…will affirm their exclusivity in
national selfhood,” and the colonizer’s exclusion would create “the patriotism of the
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colonized.”96 This vision fits into Anderson’s model of nationalist imagination, whereby
rejected colonial elites imagined new communities to accept them.97
Churchill’s denial also invited another sort of comparison for the Atlantic
Charter: the parallels between Nazi domination of Europe and Allied empires’
domination of their overseas colonies. Churchill indicated that the Charter “had in mind,
primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the
States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke.”98 Churchill’s limit qualified that
the Charter only applied to Europe, but also that it only applied to Europe under Nazism.
Hence, the Charter’s applicability hinged on the style of rule as well as geography.
Anticolonial writers have forwarded the comparability between overseas colonialism
and Nazi rule in order to more fully expose the hypocrisy of Churchill’s limitation.
Within the postwar Francophone anticolonial canon, Césaire made the most
forceful connection between the evils of Nazism, which the victorious Allies vilified,
and the evils of colonialism, which those same Allies celebrated and fought to protect.
Césaire noted that Nazism finds its roots in the application of authoritarian, extractive,
and racist methods toward “non-European peoples” through overseas colonialism.99
Fanon and Memmi made the same equation, presenting colonialism as nothing but
fascism in a non-European country.100 Sartre drew the link rather flippantly, posing
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“colonialism over there, fascism here: one and the same thing.”101 For these authors,
Western outrage against Nazism came not from its methods but from its application.
Churchill’s limitation of the Atlantic Charter to Europe certainly fit into this paradigm.
Hence, Césaire showed that Europeans’ outrage directed itself not toward
Nazism itself, but rather “the fact that [Hitler] applied to Europe colonialist procedures
which until then had been reserved exclusively” for the “darker peoples” of the world.102
Europeans applied the rule of colonial difference to their moral and legal condemnation
of Nazism, by approving of its application in the non-Western world but rejecting its
application in Europe. Sartre developed the theme further in a 1958 comparison of
French reactions to white Europeans’ victimization by Nazis in 1943 and to the
victimization of Algerians in 1958. Whereas in 1943, Frenchmen cried out, in 1958
“nobody talks about it.”103 Sartre pointed out the antimony that colonialism sends
“democratic Frenchmen to their deaths to protect the tyranny that the anti-democratic
colonialists exert,” obliging them “to fight…for the Nazi principles that we fought
against ten years ago.”104 Césaire saw similar inconsistency in Europe’s vocal
condemnation of Hitler’s violence against European victims, but silence on Nazi-like
methods applied to “Algiers, Morocco, and other places” of contemporary colonial
violence.105 Sartre also contrasted how Europeans “have seen children die like rats in the
bombing raids or in Nazi concentration camps,” but when presented with “a splendid
backdrop of red earth and palm trees,” that is, a colonial, tropical background, “we look
101
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away with a guilty conscience” when shown images of similar horror.106 Césaire and
Sartre showed that Westerners, specifically Frenchmen, hypocritically condemned the
Nazi repression while celebrating the same repression of colonized peoples.
As the case studies will show, contemporaries of the 1940s drew the same
parallel. I have developed the line of thinking here simply to show that their analyses
agree with the more famous theorists of the 1950s. Recent historians and analysts have
drawn the comparison, too. Venkataramani, with a touch of polemic, noted that for
comparing occupations, “Winston Churchill governed more alien millions the world
over than Adolf Hitler did at the zenith of his power.”107 James Blaut, too, equated the
aggression of European colonial conquests with Nazi aggression.108 Less
confrontationally, Cmiel took historians to task for failing to analyze the “sorts of
violence colonial rulers perpetrated on native populations in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries” in the same way as other violent episodes. He urged historians to broaden
their horizons from “images of state violence derived from Hitler's Germany or Stalin's
Soviet Union.”109 That is, historians have recognized the violence and oppression in
totalitarian systems with Europeans as their subjects, but have devoted much less
attention to the violence and oppression directed against non-Westerners.
Mark Mazower has drawn Césaire’s parallel directly. His recent Hitler’s Empire
acknowledges that “the Nazis planned to dominate Europe…much as the British ran
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Asia or Africa.”110 The Nazi empire drew on the experience of personnel, but more so
from ideas and institutions, from the Wilhelmine German overseas empire and other
European empires. Thus, “forced labour and many of the other impositions that shocked
Europeans when they were subjected to them by the Germans” were commonplace in
colonies, as in the French forced labor code, the indigénat.111 Likewise, when Hitler
declared “the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939, the Germans imported
the colonial model for imagining ties between advanced and backward peoples.”112
Mussolini perceived the nature of Hitler’s “New Order” for Europe as colonial, even as
his ego chafed at playing second fiddle.113
Therein lies one difference between the Nazi empire and other contemporary
colonialisms. Other empires disguised their domination in the rhetoric of civilization, or
liberation, or something other than pure domination, which could then at least be
recognized as hypocrisy. Hitler’s Japanese allies repeatedly urged him to follow their
own model, which positioned Japan as the liberator of the colonized peoples of Asia.
Likewise, Mussolini and Hitler’s own Foreign Ministry urged him to offer some counter
to the Atlantic Charter, but Hitler had no time or patience for such “superfluous
declarations.”114 Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere proved just as
hypocritical as Churchill’s Atlantic Charter, but it provided at least a rhetorical refuge
for Japan’s collaborators.
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For all its deficiencies, then, the Atlantic Charter provided some standard against
which colonized subjects could appeal. Moreover, by discrediting Nazism and
proclaiming self-determination as a goal, the Allies opened themselves to be discredited
to the extent their colonial methods replicated Nazi oppression and racism.115 If
anything, the appearance of the Atlantic Charter only served to highlight what Fanon
called the “contradictions inherent in the colonial system.”116 Césaire saw Hitler as
useful in this sense, since he “makes it possible to see things,” such as racism or
colonialism, “on a large scale.”117 Or a “white scale,” as the case might be. As this thesis
will show, anticolonial activists certainly recognized the possibilities to utilize Allied
hypocrisy and the Nazi comparison to further their own causes.
This thesis, then, concerns how anticolonial activists mobilized that rhetoric to
further their causes. The emphasis will remain on the agency of anticolonialists, and not
on Europeans and Americans granting something to the passive colonized. Fanon
recognized how activists could be stimulated, not controlled, by “international events”
which could “strengthen and uphold the native’s combativity while promoting and
giving support to national consciousness.”118 We can move Fanon’s Cold War media
strategy back into the 1940s, too, whereby each colonial incident “reverberates in the
international arena” by mobilizing the opposing camps’ (whether Allied/Axis, or
capitalist/communist) ideologically-driven arguments.119 For example, anticolonial
activists could expose the British government to embarrassment by highlighting the
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failure to fulfill the Atlantic Charter. The Nazis, like the Soviets later, could then point
to this hypocrisy to undermine British or U.S. legitimacy. In all of this, “the colonized
people are very well aware of these imperatives which rule international life” and
anticolonial activists had been prepared “to understand and grasp the situation,” and
hence manipulate it.120
Resistance by appropriation does not imply dependence on the particular source
of the citation. In discussing Marxist rhetoric, Robert Young argues that anticolonialists
participated in “a syncretic transformation of available radical discourses.”121 The
insight proves equally applicable to Atlantic Charter rights-talk and helps avoid what
some have identified as a dangerous complacency in transnational and global history
with “a view of the world that begins in Washington or London and works its way
outward and…that places the emphasis purely on the derivation of ideas and institutions
from the dominant western powers.”122 James Blaut has railed against this Eurocentric
diffusionist model, in which Europe “innovates, Outside imitates,” and the nonEuropean part of the world “progresses…by the diffusion (or spread) of innovative,
progressive ideas from Europe, which flow into it as air flows into a vacuum.”123 This
thesis can fall into this model if it constructs the Charter as an inherently liberating
artifact. In this construction, Europe and America create the Atlantic Charter, which then
diffuses out from the center where it provides the impetus for anticolonialism. This view
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de-emphasizes the role that activists play in driving anticolonial movements, rendering
them reactive to Euro-American initiatives rather than active agents.
This thesis will thus contextualize anticolonial Atlantic Charter rhetoric within
longer, pre-existing anticolonial movements in order to avoid this Eurocentric
temptation. This thesis will not posit that the Atlantic Charter itself generated an
anticolonial moment. Instead, it will detail how anticolonialists adopted and adapted the
Charter to fit their purposes. In this sense Atlantic Charter rights-talk parallels
nationalism, which “became ‘modular,’ capable of being transplanted, with varying
degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be
merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological
constellations.”124 Or, as Blaut has characterized in a non-diffusionistic view of
nationalism, such Charter-talk reflects a strategy adopted, not an innovation received.125
At the outset, I need to acknowledge limitations. As Loomba’s review of
postcolonial scholarship reminds us, “anti-colonial movements have rarely represented
the interests of all the peoples of a colonised country.”126 After all, “anti-colonial
nationalism can only be taken as representative of the subaltern voice” if we define
“subalternity” simply as being below someone else and restrict subaltern voices to their
appropriation by elites as “the people.”127 This thesis will largely neglect the voices of
women and the poor in favor of those whose voices registered in local as well as global
centers of power. This neglect is due to the limits of time and language ability on the
part of the researcher, rather than intent. Exploring in greater depth how subalterns
124

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 4; cf. 45 and 67.
Blaut, The National Question, 83.
126
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 16.
127
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 196.
125

32

interacted with, or did not interact with, the Atlantic Charter needs to be done.
Unfortunately, this study will only deal with the relatively subaltern non-Western elites
leading anticolonial movements.
As Churchill’s dismissal showed, some certainly saw these leaders as subaltern.
Yet they could mobilize the documents of the colonizer against empire. The
promulgation of a document like the Atlantic Charter might not have been intended for
the colonized peoples of the world, but they could use it. This thesis will detail that use
in three colonies, and then seek to draw out comparisons and generalities.
***
This introduction has framed the Atlantic Charter in light of critiques from 1950s
anticolonial theorists. Their contributions show that the Charter could be used as an
anticolonial tool by activists, particularly in the international environment of the Second
World War. The ideological combat between Nazism or fascism on the one hand and the
democratic idealism encapsulated in the Atlantic Charter opened up a space for
anticolonial activists to insert their own critiques. They could argue for the application
of the universal values proclaimed in the Charter, and highlight hypocrisy when their
colonial interlocutors refused to apply them.
Building on this theoretical foundation, this thesis will examine anticolonialists’
use of the Atlantic Charter in India, Syria, and the Philippines. Due to the greater
volume of material and the unique circumstances of the case, the Indian case study will
restrict its focus to 1941. Indians strongly responded to the Charter upon its appearance
and to Churchill’s denial in 1941, but afterwards attention faded in India due to the
acceleration of other developments, such as the Cripps Mission, the Quit India
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movement, and the Bengal Famine. Therefore, the chapter will restrict its focus to 1941,
the time of greatest Atlantic Charter discourse in India. By contrast, the chapters on
Syria and the Philippines will situate the political environments in August 1941, but
focus on the later war years. In Syria, use of the Charter continued throughout the war,
whereas in the Philippines use occurred mostly in 1942-1943. Each chapter will focus
when the Charter was most used, demonstrating the incredible diversity with which
anticolonial activists used the Charter as a rhetorical tool.
These case studies will demonstrate the flexibility and diversity of Atlantic
Charter-talk. In India, Syria, and the Philippines, the Charter entered complex political
situations where anticolonial audiences appropriated it in complex ways. The conclusion
will highlight the differences and similarities of the Charter’s reception, and then go on
to place the Charter within broader historiographical narratives. The conclusion will
address the Charter’s transnational use by activists from each country, and how the
Charter continued to live on for actors beyond the war.
This thesis will indicate the true intricateness of transnational and global
processes. While Churchill amalgamated his audience into the monolithic, faceless
“broad, toiling masses in all the continents,” we can see that all these masses were rather
different in all those continents. They shared a source material, which Roosevelt and
Churchill produced, but they made that material meaningful in their own ways.
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Chapter Two
“Write it in Water”1: The Atlantic Charter in India

In India, the Atlantic Charter entered a complex and tense political situation.
From the beginning, India’s part in the Second World War had been contested, and
British proposals had linked that participation to postwar promises. Those promises, in
turn, became linked to the Atlantic Charter after Churchill’s fateful September 9 speech.
That speech, more than the Atlantic Charter, electrified the Indian political scene. The
Atlantic Charter did not, in and of itself, generate any specific political movement.
However, it became integrated into ongoing political battles between Indian nationalists
and the British government. Moreover, the Atlantic Charter had drawn the U.S.
government into association with British colonial policies at the same time that a new
bilateral U.S.-Indian diplomatic relationship opened. Therefore, Indian independence
activists had new access to U.S. policymakers, whom they could pressure by citing the
U.S.-authored Atlantic Charter and drawing upon traditional U.S. anticolonialism.

India before the Atlantic Charter
The Government of India (GOI) had entered into the Second World War on
September 3, 1939, when the British Viceroy, the Marquess of Linlithgow, unilaterally
joined the United Kingdom’s September 1 declaration of war on Germany.2 The Viceroy
did not consult Indian leaders and his unilateral declaration enraged nationalists. After
Rao Saheb Sivaraj, quoted in “Central Legislative Assembly Approves Resolution Recommending
Application of Atlantic Charter to India, 12 November 1941,” in Amit K. Gupta and Arjun Dev, eds.,
Towards Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence in India, 1941 Part 1 (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, for the Indian Council of Historical Research, 2010), 72–73.
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some debate, by October 1939 the foremost nationalist party, the Indian National
Congress (hereafter, “Congress”), had decided to withdraw from participation in the
governing councils of seven provinces. In part, this decision reflected a desire to keep the
Congress unified, since Congress participation in the post-1937 governments of the
provinces had fulfilled British hopes. The British Government of India Act of 1935 had
intended to co-opt Congress leaders and to divide them. By granting “responsible
government” at the provincial but not all-India levels, the British aimed to undermine the
all-India cause. As the Congress’s symbolic and sometimes-official leader, Mohandas K.
Gandhi, put it, the withdrawal “covered the fact that we [the Congress] were crumbling to
pieces.”3
The withdrawal also strengthened the hand of the GOI, since the Muslim League
and GOI-appointed governments filled the vacuum produced by the Congress’s
withdrawal. Except for the Muslim-majority provinces where the Muslim League took
control, Indian nationalist movements’ influence waned after Congress’s resignation.
This decline reflected the broader trend in which the war “had the effect of reinforcing
the imperial presence, strengthening the colonial government’s control over public life
and temporarily halting moves to devolve power through constitutional change.”4
Moreover, the vast expansion of the Indian Army to fight in what Congress depicted as
Britain’s war undercut arguments about the need to resist British imperialism, as Indians,
at least of certain regions, willingly entered into the service of the British Empire.5
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With the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, securing the cooperation of the
Congress appeared more urgent for the British war effort. On August 7, 1940, Linlithgow
issued his “August Offer,” reiterating the British intention to elevate India to dominion
status in the future, expanding the number of Indians appointed to the Viceroy’s
Executive Council, establishing a War Advisory Council, and promising to convene a
representative Constituent Assembly “with the lease possible delay” after the war.
However, the August Offer insisted that any constitutional reform for India toward
Dominion status (self-government within the British Empire) wait until the end of the
war and include a minority policy satisfying the British Government.6 In short, the Offer
contained little that Congress had not already rejected and inserted new conditions upon
Indian nationalists, namely the need for internal Indian consensus and appeasement of
British views on the minorities. Since the Muslim League adopted a formal demand for a
separate Muslim state (Pakistan) in March 1940, the League’s demands appeared
incompatible with Congress’s insistence on an all-India federation.7 The British seemed
to have set the bar impossibly high to ensure that Indians would never reach their
conditions for independence.
Protesting against the paltry offering in August 1940, Gandhi initiated a noncooperation campaign, his first since the 1931-32 movement which had extracted the
initial British promise of future Dominion status. In October 1940, Gandhi inaugurated an
“individual satyagraha” (the Gandhian term for non-violent action) against British rule in
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 307–308, 311–312; Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its
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India and the war effort, “requiring individual Congressmen to make anti-war speeches
and undergo arrest,” daring the GOI to uphold freedom of speech and assembly. Under
Defense of India Rules adopted in 1939, the GOI simply arrested, imprisoned, and tried
numerous speakers, including Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru. Rather than forcing the
GOI to engage in a debate with Congress on modifying British policies, the GOI ignored
Congress’s demands and kept Congressmen from organizing themselves, rendering the
movement largely ineffective in its direct action objectives.8
The 1940-41 individual satyagraha campaign did, however, captivate the U.S.
audience via newsreels and press coverage. In a February 24, 1941, floor debate, U.S.
Senator Robert Reynolds charged “Britain with ‘imperialist exploitation’” and “referred
to India as a ‘subject nation, probably against the will of a majority of its people, and
certainly against the will of the followers of Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest single man in
India.’”9 In fact, in the years before the Second World War, Indian leaders had seen the
United States as a potential ally in the fight for independence, although their criticism of
U.S. failures to pressure Britain and U.S. racial discrimination often offended potential
U.S. supporters.10
Throughout 1941, as U.S. aid to Britain increased after the fall of France, U.S.
diplomatic interest in India also increased. With higher levels of U.S. Lend-Lease aid
going to the United Kingdom, the GOI sought its own agent in the British embassy in
Washington to manage U.S. wartime aid for British India. In the course of Anglo-
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American consultations in London earlier in 1941, the desirability of direct U.S.-GOI
contact impressed all parties.11 U.S. diplomats saw the British request for GOI
representation in Washington as an opportunity to send a U.S. representation to New
Delhi. British officials wished to reinforce Britain as the seat of Indian sovereignty and
officials “were anxious not to allow any suggestion of Indian sovereignty to be
expressed.”12 Recognizing U.S. leverage over the United Kingdom in the form of LendLease aid, the British allowed the establishment of bilateral U.S.-Indian ties. A joint press
release of July 21, 1941, announced that the United States and India would exchange
“agent-generals.”13
Despite the need to appease U.S. interests in order to secure aid, the exchange of
ministers could threaten British power in New Delhi. Ex-Congress president Subhas
Chandra Bose recognized the impact of a U.S. presence in India, warning German
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that “with a new American Minister and an American
Military Attaché in India, America will also have a new role in the internal politics of
India.”14 The Times of London, too, noted the great importance of Thomas Wilson’s
arrival in Delhi on November 21, though it chose to downplay any potential U.S.
influence on British Indian policy. Instead, the Times hailed his arrival as signifying “the
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cooperative policies that are now being fostered between the two countries.”15 As Bose
observed, however, the presence of a U.S. envoy at the center of GOI power created a
possible locus of influence.
The announcement of the Atlantic Charter provided Indians with an opportunity
to present their own struggle to a U.S. audience, since the Charter had explicitly linked
U.S. and British long-term policy goals. With this background, Indian responses to and
appropriations of the Atlantic Charter become more important as the first American
episode in the broader story of how Indian nationalists internationalized their dispute with
the British government and the GOI.

Indian Responses to the Atlantic Charter
Upon its publication on August 14, 1941, the Atlantic Charter received mixed
reviews in India. One of the most intriguing responses came from Gandhi himself, who
focused upon the Charter’s relation to his own theory of non-violence. Asked about the
declaration, Gandhi answered that he would congratulate the United States and Britain
when they “resort to disarmament, and call it the triumph of non-violence.”16 As was to
be expected, Gandhi attempted to shift the discourse about the Atlantic Charter from its
ostensible anticolonialism toward satyagraha. That is, Gandhi highlighted the eighth
clause of the Charter, on disarmament, rather than the third point on self-determination.17
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In an interview in November, H.V. Kamath asked Gandhi if the Atlantic Charter foretold
“the emergence of a non-violent world order,” but Gandhi denied that the Atlantic
Charter could bring about such “a non-violent new world order of my conception.”18
With this curt reply, Gandhi indicated his relative disinterest in the Atlantic Charter
except as a symptom of growing pressure on the British, which had forced them to seek
U.S. aid.19 He told Kamath “the main fact that the struggle is going on constitutes
sufficient moral pressure, so much so that the British Government’s position in America
does not appear to be quite comfortable.”20 Since Gandhi’s political goals went beyond
merely setting up a postcolonial India, he read the Atlantic Charter through a different
lens from most Indian nationalists. For Gandhi’s purposes, the Atlantic Charter had little
use and little appeal, except as a symptom of what he saw as his own movement’s
success.
Unlike Gandhi, most Indian nationalists “warmly welcomed” the third clause of
the Atlantic Charter.21 The Bombay Chronicle of August 27 described “the universal
feeling in India” that Churchill should explicitly identify the Atlantic Charter’s promises
with India. In fact, the Chronicle criticized All-India Radio for neglecting to report the
Indian demand that “if…the principle of self-determination was accepted by the British
Government,” “it should be made clear that it would apply equally to India.” The
practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.” Cf.
“Atlantic Charter.”
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Chronicle claimed that “every Indian paper” was voicing this demand.22 On September 5,
the same newspaper called on Churchill to tell India “what precisely the Anglo-American
Agreement meant to her.”23 For the Indian nationalists, the Atlantic Charter had the
potential to create a British commitment to their independence.
Whereas Indians reacted to the Charter with a cautious optimism about its
anticolonial language, some in the United States expressed skepticism about the Charter,
questioning how the arch-imperialist Churchill could commit Britain to the document’s
anticolonial clause. In the United States, critiques and comments on the Atlantic Charter
centered on apparent British hypocrisy regarding India. Senator Reynolds, who had
raised the issue of British rule in India amid Lend-Lease debates earlier in 1941, asked
“Why don’t Great Britain and the United States start imposing the four freedoms on
India…right away?”24 Observers saw India as a prime example of the contradiction
between the Atlantic Charter as rhetoric and actual Anglo-American policy, undermining
the credibility of the document and its authors.25
The discrepancy between reality and rhetoric provided an opening for critics of
the Anglo-American alliance, both domestic and foreign. U.S. anti-interventionists
quickly capitalized on the apparent discrepancy between the Atlantic Charter’s rhetoric
and British imperial realities to criticize Roosevelt for his closeness to Churchill. John T.
Flynn of the anti-interventionist America First Committee cast doubt on Roosevelt’s
“Newspaper Report on Immediate Issues” (Bombay Chronicle, 27 August 1941), in Gupta and Dev,
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23
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sincerity due to the Charter’s incompatibility with imperialist realities: “All of their
words about all the peoples in the world naming their own kind of government is
meaningless unless it applies to such countries as India” and several other Asian colonies
in addition to the Baltic States.26 Flynn presented India as the most glaring contradiction
to the self-determination clause of the Atlantic Charter. Another America First speaker,
former West Virginia Senator Henry Holt, took a similar line in a September speech in
Los Angeles. Holt contested “the warmongers[’]” claim that this was a war for
democracy with a rhetorical question: “The kind of democracy England dished out in
India?”27
Axis criticism of the Charter paralleled the U.S. anti-interventionist critique. On
August 16, Virginio Gayda, editor of an important Fascist paper, countered the Charter
point by point, asking mockingly, “as to territorial changes not in accord with the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, why are the British ‘occupying’ Palestine,
Iraq, Egypt and India…?”28 As the American-Japanese relationship deteriorated later in
1941, the Japanese press took up the same charge, with the Tokyo paper Asahi ridiculing
“the Roosevelt contention that he is fighting for democracy and emancipation of races”
based on the U.S. alliance with Britain, which “enslaved the races of India, Malay, and
Africa.”29 T.A. Raman, Gandhi’s former secretary and a correspondent for the Londonbased United Press, tried to answer these criticisms by insisting on India’s anti-Nazi
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unity, but he made no reference to the Atlantic Charter.30 As U.S.-based Indian expatriate
Krishnalal Shridharani observed in 1942, the charges of inconsistency carried weight
since “they were true and palatable to Asians who had been saying the same thing to
themselves.”31 Rather than dispel those feelings, Winston Churchill’s entry into the
debate only confirmed them and intensified Indian anger.

The Response to Churchill’s September 9 Statement
As in the United States, in Britain observers saw India as a proof-test for the
Atlantic Charter’s universality. Therefore, when Churchill spoke in Parliament on
September 9, he responded to direct inquiries as to whether the Charter applied to India.
William Dobbie, member for Rotherham, asked Churchill directly whether “he is now in
a position to make a clear statement extending the principles of Clause 3 of the
Declaration to India?” Churchill deferred to a later statement on the War Situation,
wherein he would address the Atlantic Charter’s purview, and repeated this response
when Dobbie further pressed, “In that statement does the right hon. Gentleman
[Churchill] intend to make reference to India?”32 Churchill positioned his speech to
represent the definitive government statement on the Atlantic Charter and India.
Churchill’s statement disqualified the Charter’s applicability to India.
Specifically, he referred back to the August Offer of 1940 as a promise predating and
superseding the Charter. Referring to the August Offer, as well as a similar promise made
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for Burma, Churchill claimed that the government’s statements were “complete in
themselves, free from ambiguity and related to the conditions and circumstances of the
territories and peoples affected.” Though Churchill insisted these statements superseded
the Atlantic Charter, he did voice his feeling that “they will be found to be entirely in
harmony with the high conception of freedom and justice which inspired the [Atlantic
Charter].”33 Churchill thus claimed that the British government’s existing policies already
fulfilled the conditions of self-determination laid out in the Charter. Churchill ingeniously
evaded the question about divergences between the Charter’s rhetoric and actual British
imperial policy. However, the August Offer had not satisfied Indian nationalists, so
Churchill’s explanation failed to satisfy them either, and instead aroused intense anger.
As Tory minister (and future PM) Harold Macmillan observed candidly, “I do not think
the P.M. can have realized the true nakedness of the land when he made the statement.”
British declarations were “not complete in themselves, nor [were] they free from
ambiguity.”34 Hence, Churchill had opened himself to a counterattack.
The earliest responses to Churchill’s statement proved tepid at best. On
September 10, a Liberal Party council meeting in London saw Lord Meston insist that “I
do not think there is the slightest doubt that the [Atlantic] charter is of universal
application, and if India is left out it would be futile.” Meston tacitly rebuked Churchill’s
claim that the Charter did not apply to India.35 Meston’s statement moreover called into
question the credibility of the Anglo-American alliance, insisting that if the Charter did
not apply fully to India, the Charter would have no validity at all. Likewise, when asked
33
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about Churchill’s statement by The Hindu on September 11, Gandhi “declined to answer
any question,” insisting that “after all it is not words that matter” but rather action, and
Gandhi’s “action is before all India and, if you like, the whole world.”36 Gandhi herein
offered an unflattering comparison between his own action and British policy, claiming
that whereas his own actions plainly matched his rhetoric, British rule in India failed to
match its own rhetoric, such as the anticolonial clause of the Atlantic Charter. Churchill’s
qualification of the Atlantic Charter supported Gandhi’s claim that British declarations
were meaningless.
The pro-Indian Labour MP Reginald Sorensen offered the opening salvo in the
attack on Churchill’s statement during the September 11 sitting of the Commons, when
he questioned Secretary of State for India Leo Amery about the application of the Charter
to India. Rather than take Churchill’s statement as definitive, Sorensen seemed to reject
Churchill’s explanation when he asked Amery “whether he has considered the
implication of Point Three in the Eight-Point Charter…in relation to India,” and
particularly “whether, in view of that declaration, he intends to take any further steps to
implement the accepted principle” of self-determination. Sorensen pointed to “the very
great dismay with which [Churchill’s] statement was received throughout the
country…both here and in India” to challenge Amery’s deference to Churchill’s
statement, insisting that the statement applied self-determination for colonies “to other
countries and not to our own.” Sorensen attacked Amery’s conception of the Atlantic
Charter and echoed Indian rejection of the August Offer, insisting on a different
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interpretation for the Atlantic Charter’s language on self-determination.37 In its October
23 meeting, the India League, a pro-Congress organ of which Sorensen was a member,
decided to press the same claim, petitioning Amery to reconsider the application of the
Atlantic Charter to India.38
Amery and the government’s answer echoed similar British rejections by
highlighting the internal disunity of India in order to justify delays in the transfer of
power negotiations. Amery remained firm, insisting that the August Offer from 1940 had
presented Indians with the possibility for self-government, and that the only remaining
barrier came from Indians themselves, given the disunity of the Indian political
movements.39 On May 7, Halifax had used the same argument to deflect U.S. pressure,
insisting that the British or the GOI could not negotiate with Indian nationalists due to the
Hindu-Muslim problem.40 In an August 1 memo to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, U.S.
Ambassador Winant identified this as the primary British argument, noting that “the
British have always emphasized the problem of minorities in India.”41 Thus, even when
critics pointed out the inconsistency of British colonial rule and the Atlantic Charter’s
anticolonialism, British policymakers could fall back on their longstanding argument
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about a lack of Indian unity to disarm calls for an unfiltered application of selfdetermination to India. 42
This parry by British policymakers did not stop criticism of Churchill’s statement.
Amery’s use of a familiar argument only reinforced perceptions that British policymakers
used Indian disunity as an excuse, moving the goalposts for Indian independence while
also actively undermining any Hindu-Muslim reconciliation. As Coupland put it in 1942,
the “explanation only served to inflame the suspicions it was intended to allay.”43 India’s
Tribune newspaper articulated an answer to Amery and Churchill on September 12,
wherein the comparison of the British withdrawal from Ireland, which failed to provide
for the “minority” problem of Protestants within the Irish Free State, provided a helpful
counterthrust.44 The Tribune called Amery’s technique a stalling tactic, “a flank attack”
by “diehards and reactionaries” to regain “the ground they have been forced to abandon
by the failure of their frontal attack,” namely the need to concede independence as an
imminent goal, if only after the war, in August 1940.45 The use of “diehard” apparently
referred directly to Churchill, who had led the “diehard” faction of the Conservatives
opposed to any devolution of power from Britain to Indians throughout the 1930s.46
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Notably absent from The Tribune’s response is any discussion of the Atlantic
Charter itself. Churchill’s statement on September 9, insisting that the August Offer of
1940 had fulfilled of the Atlantic Charter, had implicitly recognized that the Charter’s
third clause did apply to India. By recognizing that the Charter applied to India, Churchill
legitimized Indian nationalists’ use of the text.47 By centering his response to their
demands on the August Offer, Churchill instead turned the question back onto the
already-rejected August Offer. This allowed Indian nationalists to focus the debate on
whether the August Offer had fulfilled the accepted principle of self-determination. They
turned to this debate with vigor. Nationalists already had an ally in the metropole in the
person of V. K. Krishna Menon, head of the pro-Congress India League in Britain, who
worked “on a pamphlet dealing with the Atlantic Charter which will be used for
campaign purposes” in Britain itself.48 Menon sought to capitalize on public sympathy
for the Indian position after Churchill’s statement.49
The August Offer had announced Indian independence as the ultimate British
objective, but Indian nationalists argued that actual British policy contradicted this
rhetoric. Hence, they could criticize British policy as hypocritical. When Churchill placed
the Atlantic Charter within the framework of the August Offer, he inadvertently invited
unflattering observations about the discrepancy between British rhetoric (the Atlantic
Charter’s avowal of self-determination and the August Offer’s promise of selfgovernment) and actual policy (continued British domination of the GOI and obstruction
on the minority question). Since Churchill allowed Indian nationalists to assume the
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Atlantic Charter did apply to them, they could present their view of how the Atlantic
Charter ought to apply to India. The Atlantic Charter in and of itself had exited the
discursive field, leaving only potential criticisms of British policy, which failed to live up
to Indian nationalists’ views of how the Charter would apply to them. From September
1941, the debate would center on different Indian ideas about how the Charter should
apply to India, most of which differed with the already-rejected August Offer, leaving
only criticism of British policy and alternative visions of how to proceed from colony to
post-colony.
Moreover, Churchill left the impression among Indians that the Atlantic Charter
did not truly apply to them at all, mobilizing and crystallizing anger against British rule.
As The Tribune noted, Churchill had only played into nationalists’ hands, observing the
irony that “the only possible effect” of Churchill’s statements “is to make the party of
freedom redouble their efforts,” and in that, “he has unconsciously rendered a service of
great value to India.”50 Contemporaries who looked back on the fall of 1941 had clearer
memories of Churchill’s statement than of the Charter itself. Jawaharlal Nehru, the future
prime minister of independent India, recalled hearing about the Atlantic Charter while in
prison, serving his sentence for participating in the 1940-41 Gandhian personal
satyagraha campaign: “we heard of the Atlantic Charter, and, soon after, of Mr.
Churchill’s qualification that this charter had no application to India.”51 For Nehru
looking back, Churchill’s September 9 speech about the Charter emerged just as clearly
as the Atlantic Charter itself. Nehru’s memory of the Charter can represent the impact of
the Charter on India: the importance of the Charter lay less in the text itself than in
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Churchill’s speech about it. As Coupland put it, “if the matter had rested” with the
Charter itself, “there might have been no dispute,” but Churchill’s explanation turned the
question into a political football.52 V.P. Menon’s account of the transfer of power from
Britain to India only mentions the Atlantic Charter at all because Churchill’s speech
“caused considerable resentment in India.”53 British intelligence in Madras noted that
“Mr. Churchill’s explanation of the Atlantic Charter has been a disappointment to
practically all parties,” bringing together for a rare moment the Congress, the Muslim
League, and the Hindu Mahasabha.54 By 1942, the fallout still felt raw, made apparent by
U.S. journalist Kate Mitchell as she indexed the Indians “among all sections
of…opinion,” including non-Congressmen, who reacted against Churchill’s
interpretation.55 Churchill’s statement had transformed the debate about the Atlantic
Charter from a concern over the text and its application into a locus of opposition to
British policy generally.
Even worse, Churchill’s statement invited criticism from usually pro-British
voices within India. The first punch came from the prime minister of Punjab, the proBritish Sikander Hyat Khan, who issued a press statement on October 1 at Simla. Hyat
Khan frankly shared his wish that Churchill’s statement “had never even been made”
given the furor it provoked, citing the “considerable criticism and resentment” as well as
“despondency and dismay” it created across India. More damning, Hyat Khan considered
the statement an opportunity to question the “bonafides of British Government.” Hyat
Khan rejected applying the Atlantic Charter to India and opposed Gandhi’s satyagraha
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movement, but even this Anglophile moderate expressed frustration with the typical
British arguments about necessary qualifications on the process for devolving power in
India. Instead, Hyat Khan insisted that any new statement be made “in simple
unambiguous terms without being hedged in by avoidable qualifications,” implying that
other statements had not met these conditions.56
Coming from such a moderate and typically pro-British source, Hyat Khan’s
critique particularly damaged British credibility. The criticism would have proved
damaging enough in isolation, but Hyat Khan’s statement represented only one in a wave
of comments. Criticism came from typical allies such as leading Indian Liberals like
Supreme Court Justice Dr. M.R. Jayakar, liberal Congressman H.N. Kunzru, and nonparty (moderate) leader Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, who denounced Churchill’s equivocation
in a widely-reported November 2 statement.57 Supreme Court Justice Dr. M.R. Jayakar
“declared that ‘the British Government have done nothing to make us feel that this war is
ours too... England would have done far better if she had appealed to India’s love of
freedom and democracy rather than to fear of dreadful consequences of a Nazi victory. It
was the slave owners’ argument.’”58 Sapru angrily wrote that “Mr Churchill used
language which has made many people to doubt whether he and his Government do
really mean to part with power and whether India will ever attain real self-government.”
Having used Churchill’s speech to broach the subject, Sapru then proposed that “the
future of India should have been made clear long ago by using definite, certain and
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unambiguous language,” such as that in the Atlantic Charter and unlike Churchill’s
statement, or the August Offer.59
Illustrating this loss of credibility, Sorensen deployed the statement from Hyat
Khan to embarrass Amery in the Commons on October 9. Amery continued to stand his
ground, referring to the September 9 Churchill statement as the final word on India. Even
so, Sorensen used the exchange to suggest that, since “a gentleman of this eminence
[Hyat Khan], who can by no means be classified as an extremist, must have very great
doubt as to the real intentions of the Government,” Britain “must reconsider our whole
Indian policy to satisfy people of this kind.”60
The exchange in the Commons, reported in India, generated another Indian
response on October 11.61 The Tribune’s answer to Amery aptly summarized Indian
indignation at Churchill’s September 9 statement, which Amery had repeated to answer
Sorensen. The frustrated Tribune said that Amery and Churchill’s responses would only
be satisfactory “if the complaint of India had been that the Atlantic Charter had so altered
the [August 1940] declaration as to make it unacceptable to India.” The paper claimed
that “no one knew better than Mr. Amery that the exact reverse of this was the case.”
Instead of desiring the British government to reiterate the August Offer, Indian
anticolonialists had hoped the Atlantic Charter would, in fact, “qualify [the Offer] in such
a manner as to bring it into harmony with itself.”62 From this point the debate refocused
onto the August Offer rather than the Atlantic Charter itself, and so The Tribune
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proceeded to re-enunciate its opposition to the August Offer. The Atlantic Charter
controversy had only added fuel to the flame of controversy about the August Offer.
Hence, the paper asked rhetorically “what possible objection the British Government can
have to stating explicitly that the Atlantic Charter shall apply to India, if, as Mr Churchill
said the principles underlying that Charter are also the principles that underlie the British
Government’s Indian policy?” Indeed, the paper noted the very space which the Atlantic
Charter had opened for Indian nationalists: “Does it not occur to [Churchill and Amery]
that in the very act of denying the applicability of the Atlantic Charter to India they are
emphasizing the difference between their Indian policy and the principles laid down in
the Atlantic Charter?”63 Sapru and the Non-Party Congress noted the same discrepancy,
calling the August Offer “not wholly consistent” with the Atlantic Charter, returning to
the familiar criticism that the August Offer was “hedged in by too many conditions.”64 As
such, the Offer could not fulfill Indian demands for self-determination.
The most serious challenge to Churchill’s statement came from the Central
Legislative Assembly in British India, made up of moderate Indian statesmen. One
assemblyman proposed a resolution insisting that the Atlantic Charter did, in fact, apply
to India.65 The arguments in the debate also illustrated a wide range of ways to use the
Atlantic Charter against the British. G.V. Deshmukh rejected Churchill and Amery’s
claims with disdain, saying the British had sought the Charter only when desperate for
U.S. support, and once guaranteed that support, had thrown out the logical application to
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India.66 Likewise, Jamnadas Mehta saw the Charter as “an unequivocal declaration that
all races and countries had the right of self-determination,” rejecting Churchill’s
statement which “threw them back to the declaration of August 1940,” which he
identified as “a declarative of bondage – to perpetuate vested interests, and the British
hold over [India], giving the minorities power to veto the progress of India.” Instead of
appealing to Churchill or Amery’s interpretation, Mehta looked back to Attlee’s words on
August 15, citing Attlee rather than Churchill or Amery.67 L.K. Maitra also defended the
self-determination interpretation of the Charter as “quite clear” and “equally applicable to
all countries and races of the world including India,” from which “Mr Churchill might
now try to wriggle out.”68 Accepting the Atlantic Charter as a British affirmation of selfdetermination, Indians used that declaration to demonstrate British hypocrisy in their
actual policy, laid out in the August Offer, which maintained British-defined restrictions
on the process to transfer sovereignty. Mehta reacted particularly violently against use of
typical British arguments during the Assembly debate, yelling “You are talking like Mr.
Amery” and “You are Mr. Amery!” when a pro-British assemblyman argued that the
minority issue in India prevented the application of pure self-determination to India.69
M.S. Aney, leader of the House, though tacitly arguing against the resolution, made a
critical observation, noting that the real issue was whether India “believed that promises
coming from statesmen of eminence had some meaning or we did not believe it.”70
Though the critics of Churchill never articulated their argument in the Legislative
Assembly as such, their argument did rest on a distrust of the August Offer.
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When the Legislative Assembly continued its debate on November 12, Rao Saheb
Sivaraj provided a unique perspective on the controversy, offered in opposition to the
resolution but in no way flattering to British credibility. He recalled “the saying that
when a promise is made which we knew was not likely to be kept, we said: ‘write it in
water.’ Remembering this, it was unfortunate…that the Charter was entered into midocean,” prompting laughter from the Assembly but also evincing a jaundiced eye toward
British pronouncements. Rao Saheb Sivaraj made light of the situation, but still expected
duplicity from British leaders, noting that Churchill had entered into the Charter under
the duress of waging a war without allies, and had needed to appease a U.S. audience.
From this perspective, he saw attempts to appropriate the Charter’s rhetoric as hopelessly
naïve. However, the resolution evidently had wide support as it passed without a division
of the house.71 On November 18, the resolution then passed the upper house in the GOI’s
central legislative body, the Council of State, by a vote of 10-6, entering onto the record
and representing a formal reprimand to Churchill from the traditionally controlled halls of
the GOI.72
Churchill’s government, however, had never intended to compromise on the
question of India, not least during the war. Faced with censure from the normally
compliant Indians picked to consult the GOI, Leo Amery delivered a speech in
Manchester on November 19, likely intending to respond and settle the Indian question
for the time being. Amery ceded no ground to the British government’s critics, insisting
that the August Offer “was no less far-reaching than the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic
Charter” and indeed “far more satisfying” given its specificity. He repeated the familiar
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British arguments, insisting “there must first be substantial agreement among the various
Indian factions” for constitutional negotiations, and that hence “the actual time table [for
independence] was up to the Indians themselves.”73 Amery did not draw the connection
between the August Offer’s insistence on Indian proposals protecting minority rights to
British satisfaction and the ongoing disunity. That is, Amery did not point out that,
though he claimed the August Offer exceeded the language of the Atlantic Charter, the
August Offer provided the pretext on which he justified not implementing the Atlantic
Charter’s straightforward language of self-determination in India. Amery also responded
directly to “the clamour for what is called the application of the Atlantic Charter to
India,” which he patronizingly chastised as a “typical instance of loose thinking” on the
part of Indians, characterizing Indian critics as childish and immature (“clamour”). In
Amery’s view, Indians ought to have been pleased by the concessions British
governments had made, and then sit quietly and fight during the war, rather than dare to
make their own demands, even ones based on British declarations.
By the end of November 1941, the Atlantic Charter’s brief episode in Indian
history appeared to have ended. Gandhi showed little interest in the Atlantic Charter,
many Congress leaders languished in prison from the individual satyagraha campaign,
and other Indian leaders had pursued their critique based on the Charter through the
highest level of the GOI, but Churchill’s government stood as stalwart as ever. However,
the Charter had not been a unilateral British declaration. The Atlantic Charter, or the Joint
Churchill-Roosevelt declaration, had been an American document as well as a British
one, issued at the same time as the establishment of U.S.-Indian diplomatic ties. As an
American document, the Charter could be invoked to appeal to U.S. audiences.
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Moreover, with a new U.S.-Indian diplomatic channel, Indian nationalists could take their
interpretation to the representatives of U.S. power even before the entry of the United
States into the war after December 7, 1941.

Indian Appeals to the United States
An October 6 editorial in Calcutta’s Amrita Bazar Patrika noted initial motions
by the Indian independence movement to appeal to a U.S. audience. The editorial
reported U.S. interest in India’s anticolonial movement by citing anecdotal evidence from
a recent tour of the United States as well as reporting from Reuters, and then welcomed
U.S. journalists coming to India.74 Amrita Bazar Patrika assigned a political value to the
U.S. correspondents coming to India, and promoted sending Indians to the United States,
in order “not to propagandize in America but to tell the American people the barest truth
about India in the simplest possible language.”75 The paper rejected the label of
propaganda based on its conception of the United States, whose people the paper hoped
to convince “that the Indian cause is just and righteous.” Since the paper espoused an
image of Americans as “an intelligent and freedom loving people,” “[Americans] would
take active and lively interest in the political destinies of the vast masses of people in
[India].”76 Amrita Bazar Patrika offered an optimistic perspective on winning over the
U.S. audience, placing faith in U.S. anticolonialism to pressure Churchill or at least
rectify the pro-British bias in the U.S. press.
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The Indian expatriate Taraknath Das offered a more dire warning directly to
readers of the New York Times, representing in clear language how the Atlantic Charter
had unambiguously implicated the United States in British colonial policy. Das warned of
British “racial imperialism” generally, exemplified by “the British Government’s attitude
on the interpretation of the Atlantic Charter as given out by Mr. Churchill,” depicting it
as comparable to Nazism. Das directly tied British racial imperialism to the U.S. image
among colonized people, noting that “unless repudiated by Mr. Roosevelt,” the Atlantic
Charter would “be interpreted by several hundred millions of the peoples of the East as
another instance of hypocrisy of the British Government in which the Government of the
United States has become a party.” Having presented the threat to U.S. credibility, Das
then evoked the “definite responsibility” of the “Americans who are supporting Britain in
the present struggle.”77
Das’ editorial only represented the most public, explicit, and American
articulation of Indians seeking to draw the United States into the conflict via the Atlantic
Charter. In London, the India League’s Menon privately lobbied U.S. Ambassador
Winant.78 A Labor MP from North Cumberland observed that “[the leaders of Indian
opinion] have looked to America and other countries [to derive inspiration] and they still
so look.”79 Dr. Leslie Haden-Guest, MP for North Islington, even noted on September 30
in the Commons that a declaration “to the peoples of China and India and the black
people of Africa” that in “the democratic world for which we are fighting, there will be
equality of political and economic circumstances for all races” would reinforce “the
Taraknath Das, “‘Racial Imperialism’ an Issue: British Attitude Toward India Held in Need of Revision,”
New York Times, November 22, 1941. Emphasis added.
78
“On the Present Position of the India League, 5 November 1941,” in Gupta and Dev, Towards Freedom,
573.
79
Labor MP (North Cumberland), quoted in Rubin, “America, Britain, and Swaraj,” 44.
77

59

efforts of our friends in every land, in the United States, in China and in India.”80 HadenGuest directly tied the credibility of British pronouncements to support in the United
States and in India, so that even from a British perspective the three nations had become
linked by the Atlantic Charter.
Indians in India also linked U.S. and British policies based on the Atlantic
Charter, using appeals to the United States to criticize Britain. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru’s
statement on November 2 urged the United States to offer an alternative interpretation of
the Atlantic Charter to counter Churchill’s. Sapru appealed to anticolonialism among
Americans by claiming he found it “difficult to believe that it could have been the
intention of President Roosevelt to exclude India” from the Charter “when it is a matter
of common knowledge that American opinion for some time past has been definitely
critical of British policy towards India.” Sapru cited Secretary of State Hull’s description
of the Charter “as a statement of basic principles and fundamental ideas that are universal
in their practical application” as an American parallel to Attlee’s universal interpretation
of the Charter. Moreover, Sapru raised questions about Roosevelt’s personal credibility,
saying India could not “believe that [Roosevelt] could have been a party to the exclusion
of India from the benefits of this principle” of self-determination.81 Sapru used the
Atlantic Charter to draw the United States and Roosevelt into the Indian-British debate.
Introducing his resolution on the Atlantic Charter into the Central Legislative
Assembly, Maulvi Abdur Rasheed Chaudhury particularly highlighted “that when
President Roosevelt announced his eight points of peace and war aims of the
80
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Democracies, Indians thought that they would be equally applicable to India,” directly
tying the Atlantic Charter to Roosevelt personally.82 Chaudhury also expressed optimism
noting that “the people in this country considered that America has a certain partnership
in the British Empire and the words of the President of the United States would not be
taken lightly by the British authorities.”83 Chaudhury’s citation of Roosevelt, both in
disappointment and optimism, reflected how Indian nationalist discourse had brought
U.S. actions and figures into the Indian-British debate.
U.S. envoy Thomas Wilson also recognized Indian criticism of Roosevelt as an
attempt to exert pressure on the President. Wilson read critiques and evocations such as
Sapru’s and Chaudhury’s as attempts to attract publicity to keep “prominently before the
world India’s position” and to “force from Mr. Roosevelt some sort of statement which
might be construed as repudiation of the Prime Minister’s statement of inapplicability to
India of the Atlantic Charter.” Should Indian nationalists succeed in drawing Roosevelt
into a direct statement on India, Wilson warned that they would cast Roosevelt’s
credibility against that of Churchill.84 Amid the controversy over Churchill’s
interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, Indian voices turned to the United States and to
President Roosevelt particularly to support their argument and gain leverage against
Churchill’s British government.85
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Other Indians invoked U.S. involvement negatively, seeing the potential for U.S.
intervention as an unfortunate development. In the Central Legislative Assembly, Sardar
Sant Singh saw the Atlantic Charter as an anti-British attack, wherein “America was
really splitting up the British Empire,” and more nationalistically, argued that “India did
not look to any outsider for giving her freedom but would stand on her own legs.”86
Likewise, Cornelia Sobraji submitted a letter to the Times claiming U.S. involvement
amounted to an outsider barging into “questions as between any unit in the family.”
Sobraji argued that “one cannot believe that internal control [of India by Britain]…was in
the mind of either our Prime Minister or President Roosevelt.”87 The U.S. angle could,
thus, cut both ways, but the vast majority of voices and the most influential voices tying
the United States to India via the Atlantic Charter argued against Churchill’s
interpretation of the Charter.
The most famous Indian (to U.S. audiences) also contributed to the discussion, if
indirectly, in keeping with his personal disinterest in the Atlantic Charter. U.S.
newspapers reported October 12 comments from Gandhi, who did not reference the
Atlantic Charter but did seek to bring about U.S. pressure on Britain. Gandhi suggested
“that the United States ought not to enter the war or even give more active aid to Britain
without getting certain guarantees in advance,” saying that the United States “should ask
what will happen to India, Asia and African possessions” and “withdraw any help unless
there are guarantees of human liberties.”88 Gandhi’s notoriety brought him success on
this line, as the Chicago Daily Tribune appropriated his language to note that “another
idealist thinks it over and decides it’s not his kind of idealism,” comparing Gandhi to
“Central Legislative Assembly,” in Gupta and Dev, Towards Freedom, 67–68.
Cornelia Sorabji, “India and the Atlantic Charter,” The Times, November 8, 1941.
88
“Gandhi Advises U.S. on Policy,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 1941.
86
87

62

Lincoln, “another idealist who was forced to fight a war” with “no option of staying out,
as we have now.” However, Lincoln “had time to stretch out his hand over a whole race
and say, ‘These shall be free.’” In an unflattering comparison to Lincoln, the paper asked
“where is the British emancipation proclamation? It is a brown skinned man at a spinning
wheel who asks. Why is he not answered?”89 Kansas Republican Senator Arthur Capper
took a similar line on the Senate floor October 31, noting that while “carrying the four
freedoms to western Europe, Russia, the orient, Japan, China, India,” and elsewhere “has
a noble sound,” he feared “that in our attempts to carry the four freedoms to the rest of
the world, we may only succeed in turning the four horsemen loose in our own
America.”90 Gandhian distaste for war and the British failure to match his idealism in
their actual policies, to which Gandhi attached far more weight than declarative policy
statements such as the Atlantic Charter, provided a further weapon for U.S. antiinterventionists in their crusade against Roosevelt’s support for the British, represented
by the Atlantic Charter.
In a dynamic which would become familiar to U.S. observers during the Cold
War, U.S. ties to an imperial power presented both an anticolonial opportunity and the
threat of postcolonial resentment should the United States fail to use its leverage in the
interest of colonized peoples. With its new representation at Delhi, the Roosevelt
administration had perhaps its first opportunity to intervene in Anglo-Indian affairs when
the Central Legislative Assembly’s repudiated Churchill’s interpretation of the Atlantic
Charter. The position of the Indian portion of the GOI had great importance for U.S.Indian relations. The U.S. envoy, Wilson, arrived in Delhi on November 21, three days
“Idealism,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 16, 1941.
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after the Council of State had passed the resolution.91 Hull reminded Wilson that “one of
the reasons for the establishment of the Office of the Commissioner at New Delhi was to
enable the Department to receive timely and complete reports on just this type of
thing.”92
Wilson claimed, however, that “the ‘considerable prominence’ which the
American press gave to the passage of this resolution has most certainly not been
reflected by any section of the Indian press and editorial comment has been notably
lacking,” insisting that no real controversy existed at all.93 Wilson acknowledged that
“the Atlantic Charter has been adversely commented on editorially by many sections of
the press [in] India and that from time to time President Roosevelt’s name has been
drawn in,” demonstrating that Indian discourse had drawn the United States firmly into
the controversy.94 Like Welles’ conservative reading of U.S. criticism of Churchill,
Wilson did not see Indian criticism of President Roosevelt as in any way dire: “Mr.
Roosevelt’s popularity and press in India are almost universally excellent,” making
criticism “inconsequential.”95
Rather than challenge what it perceived as a beleaguered Churchill government,
the United States opted to keep its criticism of British Indian policy private, failing to
respond to Indian demands for U.S. intervention. The Atlantic Charter controversy had
provided the first opportunity for the United States government to intervene directly on
behalf of Indian nationalism. Under the influence of Welles and Wilson, the United
States opted not to enter directly into the Anglo-Indian dispute, despite its powerful
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leverage, which had brought about the bilateral U.S.-Indian relationship over the summer
of 1941. The U.S. government chose not to weigh in on the Indian problem at its first
opportunity to do so.
***
The Atlantic Charter did not exit the field of debate after the U.S. entry into the
war after Pearl Harbor. A 1942 pamphlet circulated in the United States repeated
Taraknath Das’ November 1941 arguments, telling Americans that “President Roosevelt,
as a co-signatory of the Atlantic Charter, has assumed a real moral responsibility for
enforcing a policy which will ensure freedom for all peoples, irrespective of their race,
color and creed,” a moral responsibility which if unfulfilled would make the Atlantic
Charter (and subsequent U.S. rhetoric) “a symbol of hypocrisy.”96 Kate Mitchell’s 1942
book also drew attention to the need to bolster U.S. credibility by supplementing the
Atlantic Charter, particularly concerning India, since “India symbolizes the whole
problem of mobilizing the colonial world in the war against the Axis” and “thus far, the
colonial peoples of Asia have not been given either the opportunity or the incentive to
fight as equal partners in the war,” specifically citing Churchill’s qualification of the
Atlantic Charter as part of this problem.97 Mitchell warned that in areas under Japanese
control, the United States and Great Britain “have yet to offer specific proof that a victory
over the Axis would mean freedom for [colonized] peoples and not merely a change of
masters.”98
However, U.S. attention had been drawn away, and the failure of their
appropriation of the Charter to elicit results drew Indian nationalists away as well. On
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December 9, in his last comments before news of the Pearl Harbor attack reached India,
Gandhi expressed his exasperation with any discussion of the Atlantic Charter. Evelyn
Wrench, editor of the British magazine The Spectator, asked him if he had hope that
Britain would ever “embrace all nations” “according to the sentiments expressed in the
Atlantic Charter?” Gandhi’s reply revealed his distrust of U.S. idealism and declarative
policy: “What is the Atlantic Charter? It went down the ocean as soon as it was born! I do
not understand it.”99
The damage to Allied credibility by Churchill’s interpretation had been done. In
early December 1941, the Congress factions issued a joint statement at Bardoli,
indicating wholesale “hostility and distrust of the British government and not even the
most far-reaching promises can alter this background, nor can a subject India offer
voluntary or willing help to an arrogant imperialism which is indistinguishable from
fascist authoritarianism.”100 As an Indian historian put it, “the hopes raised by the
Atlantic Charter...embodying the principles of self-determination of the people was
dashed by the statement of Churchill that the Charter did not apply to India.”101 Even
more crucially, Churchill’s “declaration had embittered even those Indians who were not
actively participating in the freedom struggle,” and “had angered those who had been
living abroad for many years,” broadening the base of Indians mobilized in opposition to
the British government to whatever extent.102 The impact of the Charter controversy on
the even more violent controversies of 1942, concerning the Cripps Offer and the Quit
India movement, has yet to be explored, but Churchill’s repudiation of the Charter in
“Interview to Evelyn Wrench” (appearing in March 6, 1942 edition of The Spectator), CWMG 81:347348.
100
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India and the failure of the United States to respond to Indian demands for intervention
on the question can be seen retrospectively as raising the political stakes even before the
United States entered the war.
Howard Thurman, an African-American reflecting on the Atlantic Charter in
1958, offers perhaps the most poignant summary of its impact. He, like Nehru,
remembered the Charter primarily for Churchill’s statement on it. However, he also
projected back onto the Charter the way in which it could be used against colonial power.
Challenged by fascism’s conception of a new world order, the Anglo-American allies had
found it necessary to spell out in detail their proposed new order. But in the specificity of
that order, including as it did self-determination, Churchill and Roosevelt had opened the
way for anticolonialists to challenge the very colonial order those such as Churchill
sought to uphold and which those such as Welles or Wilson proved unwilling to
challenge: “The degree to which they spelled out the meaning of democracy in clear cut
working definitions, to that degree did they create unrest within the democracy, for now
people who felt that they were denied democratic practice within the countries
themselves could have this denial defined in the light of definitions created by the
necessity to combat fascism. The rest of the story is recent history.”103
The recent history that author recalled had begun in 1941, and within this
interpretative framework, Indian appropriations of the Atlantic Charter had formed one of
the first episodes of that recent history. Indian nationalists began to draw U.S. audiences
into the debate on Indian independence at the same time as U.S. policymakers began to
exert more influence directly on India as a polity. However, the U.S. failure to respond to
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Indian nationalist calls set a precedent for the United States to defer to its imperialist
allies rather than actualize traditional U.S. anticolonial rhetoric. Eventually, the same
criticisms leveled against Churchill would turn against U.S. leaders, but anticolonial
declarations such as the Atlantic Charter would continue to give hope and provide
rhetorical ammunition for those challenging the colonial status quo.
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Chapter Three
“The Shade of Principles of Justice and Liberty”1: Syria and the Atlantic Charter

August 14, 1941, found Syria a dynamic and violent political environment. Syria
had endured internal and external turmoil since the fall of France to the Axis in June
1940. The war itself had come on the heels of a prolonged period of political crisis in
Syria. To appreciate any impact of the Atlantic Charter, it needs to be placed in the
tumultuous context of Syrian politics.

Syria before the Atlantic Charter
In 1941, the idea of the polity of “Syria” itself remained a contested construction.
France had created entirely new polities out of the former Ottoman territories it occupied
in 1920, formalized by the League of Nations as “mandates.” Though in the League’s
Wilsonian terms the French Mandates aimed toward eventual independence, the French
administered their territories as virtual colonies. The French administration disregarded
the will of their territories’ inhabitants about the borders of their polity. Between 1920
and 1936, the French mandatory regime arbitrarily reorganized their Syrian mandate into
various configurations, first expanding the former Ottoman province around Mount
Lebanon and Beirut to establish a Maronite Christian-dominated “Greater Lebanon” also
including Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze Muslims. Then, the French created “autonomous
regions” within the rump Syrian mandate: the Alawite Shi’a region of Latakia along the
Mediterranean; the Jebel Druze region along the Trans-Jordanian border; and the Frenchmilitary ruled Jazira region across the Euphrates River, home of a Kurdish minority. The
1
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remaining “Lesser” Syria centered on the Sunni Arab urban areas of Damascus, Aleppo,
Homs, and Hama. The French sought to dismantle even this agglomeration, dividing their
administration between the “state of Damascus” and the “government of Aleppo.”2 For
this project, we will consider this Lesser Syria, with its attached regions in Latakia, Jebel
Druze, and Jazira, as “Syria.”
Having failed to oust the French in a 1925-1927 revolt, pro-independence leaders
in Lesser Syria's main urban areas united in 1927, forming the National Bloc. These
leaders, largely “urban-based…absentee landlords and the wing of the commercial
bourgeoisie,” represented a narrow class interest but a wide variety of political opinions.3
By 1936 the Bloc had developed enough political strength to pressure Léon Blum’s
Popular Front government into negotiations for at least semi-colonial independence,
along the lines of British treaty relationships with nominally independent Egypt and
Iraq.4 However, post-Blum governments refused to ratify the 1936 agreement, returning
Syria to its state as a colonially-ruled mandate. Out of this process, the Bloc secured the
reattachment to Syria of Latakia and Jebel Druze as well as limited self-government.5
By entering the French-sponsored government, the National Bloc had largely
jettisoned its hopes for a “Greater Syria,” the polity which had motivated most nationalist
activists since the Ottoman era. Greater Syria incorporated present-day Syria, Lebanon,
Israel/Palestine, and Jordan.6 In the face of French intransigence on the question of
Lebanese independence, Bloc leaders largely abandoned their hopes of regaining even
2
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this component of Greater Syria.7 By the mid-1940s, the urban notables who led the
National Bloc focused on the more immediate possibility of regaining power within a
“Lesser Syria” rather than the less achievable ideas of restoring a Greater Syria, or even
pursuing a pan-Arab nation-state. As Syria’s prime minister noted in 1944, “Lesser Syria
had already existed for a generation and had its own identity.”8 Throughout the Second
World War, Syria’s nationalist leaders would focus on gaining independence for their
own limited polity rather than pursuing more ambitious policies. When they referred to
the Atlantic Charter, they would refer to it in the context of self-determination for
“Lesser” Syria rather than a Greater Syria or an Arab nation-state. Only in the postwar
era, with the French out of the way, would pan-Arab nationalists contest the more
conservative notables for power.9
Even gains in pursuit of the limited project of a Lesser Syria began to disappear
on the eve of the War, destabilizing the fraught Franco-Bloc relationship. In the face of
an imperious French representative, Gabriel Puaux, the Bloc resigned from its
participation in government in February 1939, after which Puaux suspended Syrian selfgovernment in July. Even worse for nationalists, in June France had permanently ceded
the Sanjak of Alexandretta (or Hatay), along Syria's northwest coast, to Turkey, seeking
to preserve its neutrality in an anticipated war with Nazi Germany. This move enraged
and delegitimized the Bloc, which had lobbied against such a move.10 Puaux reversed the
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Bloc's 1936 reunification of Damascus-Aleppo with Latakia and the Jebel Druze, rebalkanizing the already divided rump state of Lesser Syria. The declaration of a state of
emergency with the onset of France’s war with Germany in September 1939 completed
the stifling of any legal nationalist power in Syria.11
Thus, France's defeat in June 1940 presented a moment of ambiguity and promise
for Syria's anticolonial nationalists. On the one hand, the humiliation of France's defeat
harmed its already abysmal political reputation in Syria. On the other hand, the most
organized and radical independence pressure group, the Bloc, had been completely
humiliated and tarnished by its failures to prevent the reversal of all its gains in 1939.
Thus, even with its hated overlords humiliated, French Syria remained relatively calm
after the fall of France.12 Crucially, the Vichy government retained the loyalty of the
French government in Syria, aligning the colonial government with the Axis.
Internal and international circumstances combined after France’s fall to effect a
political realignment in Syria. On July 6, 1940, the leading non-Bloc nationalist, Dr.
Shahbandar, was assassinated in Damascus.13 At the time, this seemed an enormous
setback for the Bloc, since Puaux blamed the Bloc for their rival's death, using the
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opportunity to discredit them.14 By autumn, France’s defeat presented new opportunities
for the nationalists when an Italian “armistice commission” arrived. Ostensibly present to
enforce the Axis armistices with France, but implicitly to promote an Italian takeover of
Syria and Lebanon, the commission generated intense opposition.15 Opposition centered
on antifascism and an opposition to colonial rule generally, which new Bloc leaders
would quickly turn back against the French.16 The prospect of an Italian takeover
presented the National Bloc with an opportunity to take a stand against all foreign
domination.
With Shahbandar and other Bloc leaders cleared from the scene, a more radical
member of the Bloc, Shukri al-Quwatli, became its main leader. Quwatli had refused to
countenance the 1936 proposal for a semi-colonial state, and his absence from the Bloc's
1936-1939 government absolved him from their discredited rule. At an October 27, 1940,
meeting in Damascus, Quwatli presented the Bloc's interest as independence alone, with
no foreign alliances to any power, even Axis powers. By repudiating Italy and Germany,
Quwatli left the Bloc a maximum of negotiating room for cooperation with various
agents in the turbulent international atmosphere.17 This early opposition to aligning with
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the Axis for anticolonial purposes would give credibility to later Syrian invocations of
Allied statements.
Syria’s internal political realignment occurred amid a rapidly changing
international situation as the Allies engaged the Axis outside Europe. The British
blockade of Vichy-ruled Syria and Lebanon generated severe economic problems in both
countries by the end of 1940, continuing into spring 1941.18 Following techniques first
used in 1936, the Bloc mobilized discontent with the French government by prompting
shop closures in Damascus and then all across Syria in early March 1941.19 On March 20,
Quwatli voiced his political demands, demanding the French allow the Bloc to form a
government in order to end the crisis.20 The Vichy regime, led by rightists who had
bitterly opposed Blum and the Popular Front’s plan to offer Syria semi-colonial
independence, proved no more willing to cede power than their predecessors, and
implemented martial law.21 Vichy eventually introduced a new, non-Bloc puppet
government, after which Quwatli called off the strike.22 The Bloc had not re-entered
government, but it had forced Vichy to concede the re-establishment of a nominally
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Syrian government. Vichy brought in a new ally to head this government in late April, a
longtime French collaborator named Sheikh Taj al-Din al-Hassani.23
While Vichy had tamped down internal problems in Syria, its representatives soon
faced an external threat. In the wake of an anti-British coup, the British invaded Iraq in
May 1941. This prompted Allied fears that the Axis might use Syrian air bases against
Britain in Iraq, culminating in the June invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the British and
their Free French allies.
Amid these rapid geopolitical shifts, Quwatli attempted to articulate the position
of Syrian anticolonialists to the lead U.S. representative in Syria, Cornelius van Engert.
Quwatli attempted to secure concessions from the Allies and their U.S. benefactor by
emphasizing the Axis threat and by conflating opposition to the Axis and Allied
colonialism. This helped explain why antifascist Syrians would attack the British
consulate in Damascus on May 4 in protest against the invasion of Iraq. One Bloc leader,
Fakhri al-Baroodi, equated Hitler’s racism with London and Paris' handling of "the fate
of the Arabic speaking countries."24 Within this context, the Bloc saw the Iraqi protests
not as pro-German but anticolonial, a mark of pan-Arab solidarity against colonialism
writ large, not only British colonialism. In an April meeting with Engert, Quwatli applied
this logic to Syria’s situation, suggesting that "German propaganda was in a very strong
position because" it promised Syria independence, whereas "the British...had not only
refused to make a similar statement but had apparently promised Turkey slices of
Northern Syria and Iraq in return for Turkish military support." Quwatli said he would
gladly support the Allies if Britain were "to express sympathy with the Arab cause by
23
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making definitive promises." For good measure, Quwatli appealed to an Arab trust in
U.S. honor, asking that British guarantees be made "preferably in consultation with the
American Government."25 After the British invasion of Iraq and rising concern over
Vichy in Syria, Quwatli re-emphasized to Engert that "everything could be arranged if
only Great Britain would make a definite statement promising Syria her independence
after the war."26 Even The Times recognized that "Syrians are more anti-French than proGerman," and indeed the newspaper presented exactly the solution suggested by Quwatli:
"A British declaration in support of Syrian independence and Arab unity would
counterbalance German propaganda."27 Seeing which way the wind was blowing, Taj alDin also courted the Allies, denouncing the Axis while also emphasizing his loyalty to
France.28
On June 8, 1941, many Syrians did cooperate with the Allies’ invasion, which
ended with the Vichy French defeat on July 14. 29 Syrians welcomed the prospect of a
new political and economic situation with the arrival of the Allies, with most people
looking forward to British food shipments rather than British troops.30 More interesting to
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Syrian nationalists, however, was the proclamation issued by the Free French
representative in the Near East, General Georges Catroux, issued at the start of the Allied
invasion:
I come to put an end to the regime of the mandate and to proclaim you free and
independent. You will therefore be from henceforward sovereign and independent
peoples and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate states or to unite into
a single state. ...France declares you independent by the voice of her sons who are
fighting for her life and for the liberty of the world.31

Perhaps more forcefully, on July 1, after Allied forces had recaptured Damascus, Free
French General Legentilhomme "announced to members of the Syrian Government in
Damascus that Syria is now independent, and that the French mandate is cancelled."32
Taken at face value, Catroux and Legentilhomme seemed to have voided France’s
mandate over the Levantine states and declared each of them independent. In exchange
for their military support, the British had insisted on a clear declaration of independence
for the Levant states.33
Nestled in Catroux’s statement, however, was the caveat that “your statute of
independence and sovereignty will be guaranteed by a treaty in which our mutual
relations will be defined. This treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your
representatives and myself.”34 Such a treaty had torpedoed the 1936 independence
proposal, with the National Bloc unwilling to countenance a treaty which codified French
influence in an independent Syria. As early as June 24, when de Gaulle wrote Catroux his
31
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instructions for carrying out his duties as “Delegate-General” (a semantic replacement for
'High-Commissioner') to Syria and Lebanon, the real intentions of a prolonged
independence process emerged. In his letter, de Gaulle wrote of how the mandates "must
be brought to an end." Whereas the declarations had said the mandates ended
immediately, de Gaulle now presented ending the mandate as a future event.35 Moreover,
early journalistic readings of the statement demonstrated more nuance than Catroux or
Legentilhomme appeared to articulate. The Times presented the statement not as a
declaration of independence but a recognition of “the claim of Syria and the Lebanon to
independence.”36 The New York Times, applauding the statement because it “was devoid
of ambiguity and did not lend itself to misinterpretation,” called it merely an “assurance
of independence,” a future promise rather than a fait accompli.37 Syrians presented their
straightforward interpretation of the text as an anticolonial one.
The puppet regime set up by Vichy in April presented itself as the independent
government of Syria upon Allied victory. When Allied forces entered Damascus on June
23, they found the French flag lowered from official buildings, and the regime
proclaimed that "internal matters hitherto under French supervision should henceforth be
controlled by the Syrian authorities. Amnesty was granted to political prisoners."38 After
the disillusionment of the failure to secure independence as promised during the First
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World War, declaratory rhetoric did not satisfy Syrians, so that by June 15 Damascene
papers questioned the sincerity of Allied enticements in the proclamation.39
After the British and Free French completed their occupation of Syria and
Lebanon, the difference between the declaration of immediate independence and reality
quickly became clear. The Times articulated it succinctly, noting that "the effective
independence of Syria" must await negotiation and definition, at least during the war,
which "will doubtless require the presence of British and French units for the duration."40
After the armistice, Syria and Lebanon remained under martial law, with two layers of
authority placed over the Syrian and Lebanese governments: Catroux as DelegateGeneral, and then the British military command. At this point, the Syrian and Lebanese
governments' "powers [had] been sharply curtailed."41 By August 15, the French had
returned control of Damascus' police to the Syrian administration, but the New York
Times still speculated that with large continuity of Vichy officials under the Allied
regime, Syrians must have "[begun] to wonder whether there had been a change of
regime."42 Coming just as the Allies appeared to settle in for a long occupation, the
Atlantic Charter must have seemed like another empty diplomatic promise from the
West. Like Catroux’s statement, the Charter’s clear language was soon contradicted by
Allied policy.

Independent Syria?: September 1941-1942
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The Allied government soon ruled out installing the volatile National Bloc for its
nominally independent government of Syria. Instead, it turned to Taj al-Din, the reliable
French collaborator.43 Thus, Taj al-Din emerged as the President-designate of an
“independent” Syria on September 20, 1941, with a designated government under an old
ally of the assassinated Shahbandar.44 Armed with a Syrian administration to match an
ostensibly independent Syrian state, Catroux then proclaimed Syrian independence again
at Taj al-Din's inauguration ceremony on September 27 in Damascus.45
Taj al-Din proceeded to use Syria's declared independence as a weapon to
legitimize his rule. Taj al-Din's administration issued stamps with September 27 as the
date of Syrian independence.46 Then, in 1942 Taj al-Din urged Syrians to celebrate
September 27 as the first anniversary of independence.47 Beyond legitimating the
government over which he presided, the use of September 27 also connected Syrian
independence with Taj al-Din personally, a brilliant appropriation of forces outside his
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own political control to further his personal power. In one of his many attempts to gain
U.S. recognition, Taj al-Din also claimed that “we Syrians have the right to expect early
recognition of our independent national status as compatible with the spirit of the Atlantic
Charter.”48 While diplomats did not grant Taj al-Din’s demands, other Syrians would use
a similar line of reasoning, focusing on the need for a concrete transfer of power to match
France’s declaration of Syrian independence.
Catroux's declaration again highlighted the gulf between declaratory and actual
policy, as he added to the June 8 declaration that "the Syrian Government will begin for
the first time to assume and practise...the rights and prerogatives of an independent
sovereign State." However, the declaration then delineated severe limitations on this
supposed sovereignty, as "Syrian sovereign and independent rights are subject to
reservations necessitated by the war between the Allies and Germany," "it is required that
Syrian policy should conform closely with that of the Allies," "the Syrian Government
will place their forces at the Allies' disposal," and "the Allied Command will dispose...of
Syrian communications, aerodromes, and harbours." Taj al-Din accepted all these
limitations on his “independent” state as "a solemn proof that France was always
generous and an emancipator of nations."49
The gap between the reality of power and the declaratory transfer of “authority”
invited cynicism.50 Almost as soon as Taj al-Din assumed the presidency, The Times
noted in an October 6 analysis that Syrians "do not expect the grant of full independence
during the war, and realistically observe that it would not mean anything while the
“Syria Appeals to U.S. to Recognize Status.”
“Independence of Syria”; further details provided by the Consul-General’s notes on the speech: Engert
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50
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country is necessarily under military occupation." Even this British newspaper
recognized that "admittedly [independence] does not mean very much of a change
immediately." The Times justified the unilateral nomination of a president by the French,
answering Syrian and Arab criticisms calling for the return of constitutional government,
arguing that the Bloc's allegedly pro-Axis sentiments made its inclusion in a decision for
Syria's governance too risky. More tellingly, The Times observed that Taj al-Din was
most likely "to negotiate a treaty with the Free French safeguarding the post-war position
of France," whereas more radical nationalists would dispute both the need for such a
treaty and France's hoped-for neocolonial provisions such as those enjoyed by Britain in
its treaty relationships with Iraq and Egypt.51
The Times' analysis proved surprisingly prescient. Since the fall of France obliged
the British and the Free French to employ such tactics as promising independence in
order to take control of France's own possessions, the whole political calculus of Syrian
anticolonialism shifted. The proclamation forced a shift in France's own declaratory
policy, from promising future independence to asserting present Syrian independence,
making the maintenance of a facade of independence more difficult to manage
rhetorically. The Free French forced themselves into a political environment with all
discussion re-oriented immediately toward a postcolonial situation rather than a road
towards independence. With Taj al-Din, the French hoped to secure agreements for a
postcolonial situation politically dominated by France.

“Settling down in Syria”; Churchill used the Iraqi and Egyptian examples repeatedly to reassure de
Gaulle and the French that his support for Syrian “independence” did not seek to disrupt France’s political
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Taj al-Din had tied his political star to recognition of his Syrian regime as
independent. Taj al-Din was most persistent in his efforts to secure U.S. recognition of
Syria as an independent state, lobbying the U.S. consul-general in Beirut on numerous
occasions throughout his tenure.52 Taj al-Din declared in an interview with the New York
Times on November 7, 1941, that Syria had achieved “concrete, practical
independence.”53 The French settler press in Beirut highlighted the independence
transfers in both Syria and Lebanon and celebrated the French-appointed leaders.54
Throughout 1942, Taj al-Din would badger U.S. diplomats about recognizing his
regime.55 He attempted to curry favor to sweeten that concession at every turn.56 Taj al-

52

For the first time on October 22 and 24, 1941: Engert (CG Beirut) to State, October 24, 1941, FRUS
1941, 3:793. He later tried to curry favor for recognition with the United States, asserting that “Syria stands
unreservedly alongside the United States and its Allies in the conflict that has broken out in the Far East...
We associate ourselves heart and soul and with our full resources with the efforts of the United States to
liberate humanity from the forces of evil and to restore their liberties to countries robbed of them.” “Syria’s
Stand Taken with U.S. in Orient,” New York Times, December 19, 1941. Likewise, Taj al-Din wrote to
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in late December 1941, “pledging loyalty to the United States in
the war,” desiring that the United States recognize Syrian sovereignty; Summer Welles to President
Roosevelt, “Summary of Correspondence,” n.d., OF 1922 (Cornelius von Engert), FDRPL. After the U.S.
invasion of North Africa in November 1942, Taj al-Din made the rather un-sovereign statement that “Syria
will put its resources at the disposal of the United States ‘until the day of victory’”; “U.S. Hailed in Levant
as Arabs’ Liberator,” New York Times, November 23, 1942. Likewise, on December 31, 1942, Taj al-Din
sent a telegram to Roosevelt “embodying wishes for the New Year and hopes that year will mark victory
and restore to people all rights and liberties”; “Summary of Telegrams to President Roosevelt on the New
Year,” n.d., OF 2418 (Syria), FDRPL.
53
“Syria President Bids Arabs Aid the Allies,” New York Times, November 8, 1941.
54
“A Damas, samedi l’indépendance syrienne sera proclamée par le général Catroux et saluée par 21 coups
de canon,” La Syrie et le Proche-Orient, September 27, 1941; “Indépendance de la Syrie,” La Syrie et le
Proche-Orient, September 28, 1941; Longin, “Il faut remonter à 1920 pour trouver pareille liesse,” La Syrie
et le Proche-Orient, September 30, 1941; “En l’honneur du Cheikh Tageddine,” La Syrie et le ProcheOrient, October 1, 1941.
55
The regime pounced on the appointment of a new Consul-General in June 1942 to make its claim again;
Gwynn (CG Beirut) to State, July 13, 1942, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1942, vol. 4, The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1964), 598.
56
Offered “to make any provisional arrangement we wished to safeguard all American interests until after
the war” in February 1942: Engert (CG Beirut) to State, February 6, 1942, FRUS 1942, 4:643; offered tax
exemption for American hospitals in August 1942: Gwynn (CG Beirut) to State, August 21, 1942, FRUS
1942, 4:656–657; Gwynn (CG Beirut) to State, August 31, 1942, FRUS 1942, 4:659; Gwynn (CG Beirut)
to State, September 12, 1942, FRUS 1942, 4:659. Syrians used sheer flattery, too: Taj al-Din’s Foreign
Minister, Fares al-Khoury (a once and future National Bloc leader) explained his anxiety to receive U.S.
recognition “as it would, he said, be the only one of any real value”; Gwynn (CG Beirut) to State, August
21, 1942, FRUS 1942, 4:657.

83

Din also tried to play the various Powers against one another, such as when he suggested
that U.S. recognition could delegitimize German propaganda claiming U.S. nonrecognition stemmed from Zionist schemes for Syria.57 U.S. refusals of recognition
testified to the bankruptcy of claims of real Syrian independence, as the new consulgeneral in June 1942 noted, writing “I see no urgency in going further toward recognizing
an independence which is fictitious.”58
Nonetheless, by making claims based on Great Power policy declarations and
attempting to create competition among them, Taj al-Din used the limited assets he held
to legitimate his own regime and thus his own power. Unfortunately for him, Taj al-Din’s
French patrons had less power amid the political and military constraints of the war. The
fall of France rendered the Free French militarily weak, forcing them to rely on British
support and follow British policies such as declaring independence. By late 1941, the
Bloc had already reorganized and remobilized under Quwatli, and it no longer pursued
57
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the moderate policy of the 1930s. In March-April 1941, it had proved its ability to
destabilize an unsuitable regime. With the new European overlords already divided
between British and Gaullist French, and with the economic situation remaining unstable,
Quwatli and the Bloc saw further opportunities to destabilize the situation and force a
change. Once the United States entered the war and assumed ever-greater military
supremacy, Syria could appeal to its declarations to justify its own vision of Syrian selfdetermination and independence. While by no means the only tool, the Atlantic Charter
would reappear in Syrian anticolonial rhetoric throughout the war as activists sought to
secure U.S. support against French ambitions to continue domination.

Syrian Appeals to the Charter, 1943-1945: Crises and Opportunities
Syrian use of the Charter interacted dynamically with appeals to other more direct
documents, namely the declaration of independence from June 1941. A London Times
editorial lauded Syrians who viewed Catroux's declarations as "a promissory note" to be
cashed at the end of the war, with the current limited independence as an upfront
"payment on account."59 Appeals to the Charter were only one example of Syrians
playing the various Allies against one another. Philip Khoury notes that "the veteran
nationalists did not have to make any further concessions to France," simply turning to
the British or Americans when French terms displeased them.60 As the war progressed,
the growing military preponderance of the United States made it an attractive ally, and its

59
60

“Settling down in Syria.”
Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, 618.

85

anticolonial idealism as expressed in the Atlantic Charter provided a language Syrians
could easily appropriate.61
One Syrian, the Damascene judge Mohammed Aziz El-Khani, appealed to
President Roosevelt directly, handing a letter to the President’s representative in the
Middle East, Patrick Hurley. Hurley indicated that the letter “is typical of the expressions
I have received from both Moslem and Christian Arabs,” noting that “almost invariably
the members of the Moslem faith with whom I have conversed have shown an
understanding of the principles by which you are actuated and have expressed complete
confidence in your leadership.”62 The Atlantic Charter figured among those principles,
since El-Khani explained to the President Syrians’ desire “to obtain their complete rights
in the Peace Convention,” a desire he portrayed “in the shade of principles of justice and
liberty emanating from the spirit of the Atlantic Charter.”63 Indicative of these citations,
El-Khani immediately followed this invocation with an appeal for U.S. support, noting
that achievement of these principles would depend on “your actual support on which our
nation put all her hopes to attain her desires relying on your love of supporting the
friendly nations like Syria.”64 El-Khani moreover offered a flattering image of the United
States, claiming rather grandiosely that “the existence of the Republic of the United
States of America…is the strongest guarantee for the success of the principles of truth,
justice and liberty, which is sought by the Arab Moslems and which is the basis of their
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sacred religious teachings.”65 Roosevelt’s reply merely expressed hope “that the day is
not far off when the Syrians will enjoy the great blessings of full independence,”
indicating the limitations of appealing to the Atlantic Charter for concrete results.66
Nonetheless, El-Khani’s letter reveals how political actors, far from the centers of
imperial power, could mobilize resources such as the Charter to secure audiences for their
proposals.
In diplomatic and popular appeals, the Atlantic Charter recurred repeatedly in
attempts to involve the U.S. government in Syrian affairs, or even change U.S. policy in
the Middle East. Atlantic Charter rhetoric appeared most forcefully during crises, which
the independent governments of Syria and Lebanon faced in November 1943 and May
1945. In appeals during these crises Syrians cited their desire for a world order where the
Atlantic Charter would protect their right to sovereignty against French interference.
Later in the war, when the U.S. government shifted toward greater support of the Zionist
project in Palestine, Syrian activists increasingly turned their Atlantic Charter toward
opposing that policy.
Situating the crises of 1943 and 1945 requires a continuation of the narrative of
Syrian nationalism during the war. After the Allied conquest of Syria and the installation
of the Taj al-Din government in September 1941, the ingredients for political unrest
remained. First of all, economic deprivation continued, providing the National Bloc with
the grounds it needed to mobilize popular protest against the French-backed government.
Bread scarcity caused riots in Hama and Homs as early as September 1941.67 With
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wartime occupation continuing into 1942 and the Nazi drive into Egypt, the Allied
pressures on Syria only increased after occupation, providing plenty of fodder for the
Bloc’s opposition to the Taj al-Din regime.68 More importantly for the Bloc’s political
purposes, Taj al-Din’s continuing refusal to challenge the French to restore constitutional
government and sovereignty rendered him increasingly unpopular. Taj al-Din exasperated
even his own supporters, with pro-European and anti-Bloc prime ministers resigning in
April and then December 1942, leaving office angry about their hands being tied by the
Taj al-Din.69
Backed by anger over food shortages and Taj al-Din’s complicity with France, the
National Bloc demanded that the French restore the constitutional regime which had
governed Syria until the outbreak of war in 1939, knowing it could win any election.70
The German offensive into Egypt provided General Catroux with a pretext to delay the
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return to constitutional government, but once the threat to Egypt passed, the Bloc
escalated its pressure tactics.71
Again, Sheikh Taj al-Din proved as crafty as ever, arranging for a majority of
deputies to elect him president should the French recall the 1939 parliament.72 His Allied
sponsors foiled his plan, however, as the struggles within the French leadership after the
U.S. invasion of North Africa provided another distraction for Catroux to justify delaying
any change to the constitutional basis for the Syrian administration. In the meantime, Taj
al-Din himself fell ill and died in the first days of 1943. His January 17 death left a
political vacuum in Syria, as Catroux conceded that elections needed to be organized but
remained in Algiers rather than return to the Levant to authorize them.73
With Taj al-Din’s exit, the field finally opened for the National Bloc to take
power in Syria. Just as in March 1941, the Bloc appropriated bread strikes which erupted
in Damascus to voice their discontent. Rioting crippled Damascus in early February and
then again in late March of 1943.74 While the link is not clear, in the days after the second
strike broke out on March 20, Catroux returned to Syria and began arranging an
election.75 The Bloc had forced the French regime to concede self-government on
nationalist terms. Syria’s elections did not constitute self-determination in a purely
democratic sense, for as observed earlier, the National Bloc reflected a clear elite
landowning and mercantile class interest. The elections to be held in July 1943 would
71
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likely not be free and fair. Catroux noted, cynically, that “were elections to be held,
political rivalries between professional politicians would play a controlling role in the
cities” while “in the country districts the same leading landed families which had elected
their representatives to former parliaments would control results.”76 Quwatli counted on
this strategy, as the Bloc had in elections in the 1930s. The strategy worked again,
leading to a landslide Bloc and pro-independence victory.77
Quwatli became the first elected president of Syria in August 1943, and he
immediately began appropriating the Atlantic Charter. At his inauguration in August
1943 he outlined his intention to develop “Syria’s international relations in accordance
with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.”78 Unlike Taj al-Din, Quwatli used the Charter
in the same way the United States did, namely as a rhetorical tool outlining declaratory
policy. By claiming to align Syrian foreign policy with the Charter, Quwatli could lay
claim to guarantees offered by the Charter to self-determination as well as hold more
powerful states to a diplomatic moral high ground, a rhetorical space within which to
compensate for Syria’s weakness. As early as October 1943 Quwatli expressed his hope
that “further steps…be taken progressively to apply Atlantic Charter principles to Levant

76

Wadsworth (DACG Beirut) to Secretary, March 12, 1943, FRUS 1943, 4:958. This evaluation of
National Bloc “democracy” also came in “Syria and the Lebanon - The Bid for Independent Status,” The
Times, January 20, 1944.
77
Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, 602. Quwatli and the Bloc made the depth of France’s defeat in
the July 1943 elections clear on the convention of the new parliament August 17. The Syrians eliminated
France’s special box in the chambers, relegating them to the diplomatic box with the other foreign
observers, with no special status. The Syrian band only played half of “La Marseillaise” when the French
delegation entered the reception afterward: Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, 603–604; ceremony
also recounted in Wadsworth (DACG Beirut) to Secretary, August 18, 1943, FRUS 1943, 4:985–987.
Wadsworth also noted that the French were received among other diplomats, not in a special box.
Moreover, at the reception, the “French were told constitutional Chief of State did not return calls. Further,
Quwatly parliamentary address was seemingly pointed in referring to Free French, not France; and in
conversation French Damascus residency is now referred to as the Ambassade” (p. 986).
78
Wadsworth took particular note of it: “High lights [from Quwatli’s speech] were reference to Atlantic
Charter”: Wadsworth (DACG Beirut) to Secretary, August 18, 1943, FRUS 1943, 4:986; cf. Mardam Bey,
Syria’s Quest, 79.

90

States,” appropriating the Charter as a guarantee of greater sovereignty and challenging
the Allies to live up to their declarations.79
The election of nationalists to power in Lebanon in September would set the stage
for the first major confrontation between the French authorities and the Levantine
states.80 The Lebanese parliament voted to expunge their constitution’s specific reference
to France’s mandatory role, eliminating any indigenous legal recognition of the Mandate.
Catroux’s replacement in the Levant, General Jean Helleu, did not respond kindly, having
the Lebanese President and Cabinet arrested on November 11. France delayed
information leaking out from Lebanon, postponing the popular response in Syria. In this
case, as in prior strikes and riots, popular anger outpaced government elites. One deputy
noted that deputies faced “public pressure for immediate demonstrations.”81 Though
“unruly mob pressure” perhaps incentivized Syrian mobilization in support of Lebanese
nationalists, the National Bloc used the moment as it had in March 1941 and 1943.82
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Throughout the Lebanese crisis, Syrian protestors appealed to the Atlantic Charter
to decry French action and to call for U.S. intervention against France. Most notably, on
the evening of November 13 a delegation of about one thousand Damascene students
demonstrated at Allied consulates. At the U.S. Legation, “five student spokesmen
presented [a] written protest condemning France’s acts in Lebanon adducing Atlantic
Charter.”83 A Damascus newspaper associated with the Bloc, Al-Insha, asserted on
November 23, 1943, that “the Atlantic Charter, by recognizing the right of all nations to
their independence, has effectively abolished the Mandate.”84 Catroux attempted to use
the Charter differently, taking up Churchill’s line citing the Charter as a justification for
empire, but this does not seem to have made any impact among Syrians.85
France’s use of blatant force aroused intense displeasure in the Allied capitals,
and this displeasure more than soaring appeals to the Atlantic Charter led the British and
Americans to force the French to restore the Lebanese government.86 Having lost its
ability to compel compliance by force, the French military quickly concluded agreements
transferring most non-military authority to the Syrian and Lebanese governments.87
These victories emboldened both the Syrian and Lebanese governments, which presented
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a united front against the French.88 The governments continued to voice their goals in the
language of the Atlantic Charter, a rhetoric which had coincided with successfully
drawing the United States into conflict with the French. The Levant states even
heightened the Atlantic Charter rhetoric, invoking the Charter not only as principles but
as aims of a war they wished to join. Hence, the Syrian Foreign Minister told the U.S.
Consul-General in December 1943 that the “Syrian and Lebanese Governments were
considering issuing [a] declaration to effect that they were determined to continue
cooperation with Allied war effort to [the] fullest measure [of] their strength and
resources on [the] basis [of] Atlantic Charter principles,” and hence declare war against
the Axis.89 Although the war declaration did not materialize, the Atlantic Charter
reappeared in anti-French language.
In 1944, as the French continued to hold out for treaties with the Levant states
modeled on the neocolonial treaties Britain had with Egypt and Iraq, the Syrian and
Lebanese governments remained united, hoping to outlast the French until the end of the
war when “we like to believe that the principles of the Atlantic Charter will be applied.”90
This language went back to 1942, when Syrians resisted French insistence on a treaty
with their puppet president Taj al-Din. At that time, Catroux had noted that the Atlantic
Charter had seemed to give rise to hopes among Syrian nationalists, a view with which
88
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U.S. Consul-General George Wadsworth concurred. To Catroux’s chagrin, Wadsworth
felt that the Syrian nationalists correctly sensed that a new era had emerged in diplomacy
with the Atlantic Charter at its center. Hence, only a mutually-sought-after treaty “would
seem to be compatible with the Atlantic Charter principle in question” in the new
environment Wadsworth imagined and for which Syrians hoped.91 Along these lines,
Syrian diplomats claimed that a French treaty contradicted “the implied terms of the
Atlantic Charter.”92 Syria claimed it would gladly establish relations with France upon
independence, applying the unspecified “principles of the Atlantic Charter,” like those
Wadsworth mused about in 1942.93
The transfer of most power in 1944 finally convinced the U.S. State Department
to recommend recognizing Syrian independence.94 President Quwatli used the same
Atlantic Charter rhetoric Taj al-Din had used, repeating it at his inauguration. He
portrayed U.S. recognition as “a confirmation of the political traditions of the United
States and of its idealism,” which he traced back to President Wilson’s “principles of
justice for all nations” and the King-Crane commission’s work in 1919. Quwatli then
elevated Roosevelt’s statesmanship, claiming that with “the Atlantic Charter and the Four
Freedoms which you yourself proclaimed you have given a new impetus to the traditional
American policy.”95 Aside from the panegyrics, Quwatli also used the Atlantic Charter
for Syria’s chief geopolitical goal – the prevention of a French treaty. Hence, Quwatli
portrayed Syrian refusals to negotiate with the French before a transfer of arms as merely
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following “the principles of the common law and the basic rules proclaimed in the course
of this war concerning the law of nations by the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations’
Declaration, and other documents and statements.”96
During the last stages of the war, Quwatli and Syrians would call upon Atlantic
Charter rhetoric again as tensions with France reached a boiling point. After the D-Day
landings and the liberation of Paris in the summer of 1944, de Gaulle’s French
government finally had undeniable international legitimacy and recognition,
strengthening France’s hand against its Syrian challengers.97 After rounds of negotiations
over the transfer of all native troops to the Syrian authorities failed in February, March,
and June 1944, France had no interest in reopening negotiations until it strengthened its
military hand in Syria.98 Throughout early 1945, student protests demanding a national
army and reactive French shows of force ratcheted up tensions in Syria.99
Amid these tensions, Quwatli institutionalized his administration’s appropriation
of the Atlantic Charter by aligning Syria formally with the Allies. Quwatli hoped to gain
a voice at the upcoming San Francisco Conference and achieve a level of security vis-à-
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vis France by joining its own purported security bloc, the new United Nations
Organization. Quwatli had inquired about joining the United Nations alliance in late
February, wanting to know whether or not declarations of war against Germany and
Japan were necessary.100 Finding the answer to be affirmative, Quwatli then quickly
pushed through declarations of war against Germany and Japan on February 26 by a vote
of 214-2.101 Despite fulfilling the Allied requirements for invitation, France was loath to
invite Syria as an equal to the Conference before it had extracted the desired treaty.
Therefore, Quwatli used the gathering of Arab leaders at Cairo creating the Arab League
to lobby for support. With Egyptian pressure as well as help from new diplomatic
contacts in the United States and the Soviet Union, Syria secured an invitation (along
with Lebanon) on March 17.102
The declarations of war increased the popular drive for an army, since “there was
puzzlement in people’s minds about the logic of a declaration of war by a country with no
army of its own,” bringing the failure of France to transfer power over the Troupes
Spéciales to mind.103 While Syria and the other United Nations conferred at San
Francisco, France made its move to force concessions from the Syrians, announcing
moves to reinforce its military contingent in Syria and Lebanon on April 27. Syria was
already reeling from renewed demonstrations in Damascus calling for a national army
after a Druze detachment had deserted the Troupes Spéciales to join the national
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gendarmerie.104 900 French troops arrived in Beirut on May 5, but the Syrians controlled
the release of this news to prevent public uproar.105 By May 14, however, public outcry
had risen to fever pitch with demonstrations in Damascus, and Parliament responded to
public pressure and passed a law depriving any Syrians in the service of other countries
their nationality, attempting to pressure members of the Troupes to desert as the Druze
had.106 The dam burst on May 17 when yet another contingent of French troops arrived at
Beirut, prompting furious protests across Syria’s major towns. Popular anger proved too
powerful for the Bloc to control.107
When the French presented fresh demands for a treaty to the Syrians and
Lebanese on May 18, the attempt at intimidation was not appreciated. The pressure
united the Syrians and Lebanese, who agreed not to negotiate under such conditions.108
Syrian protest demonstrations and strikes paralyzed normal life, focusing anger against
the continued French military presence.109 Syrians prepared for an armed confrontation
with French troops, especially after a confrontation in Aleppo left three French soldiers
dead.110 On May 24, Syrian protestors began guerrilla-like attacks on the French, forcing
them to withdraw from strategic points in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama by May 26. The
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attacks continued in all major cities through May 31.111 From May 29-31, the French
army shelled the Syrian Parliament and various government buildings indiscriminately,
allegedly attempting to kill the National Bloc leaders and the majority of
parliamentarians, who were scheduled to be in session when the attack began.112 French
forces shelled and bombed sites across Damascus and across Syria over the next 48
hours.113 Finally, British forces intervened, ordering the French back into their
barracks.114
Amid the military onslaught, Syrian protestors and diplomats appealed to the
Atlantic Charter, urging the United States to intervene and stop the French attack. On
May 20, just after the French demands became public, a telegram signed from “the
inhabitants of Sulemieh, Syria” bitterly recounted that “the perfidious attitude of France
with respect to Syria and the Lebanon is in contradiction with the principles of the
Atlantic Charter.”115 On May 29, as the French military operation escalated, the U.S.
Embassy received two appeals for U.S. intervention, one signed from “the women of
Syria” charging the United States to “safeguard the principles of the Atlantic
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Charter…the realization of which you have assumed the responsibility.”116 The other,
from one Khudr Chechakli [sic], asked more forcefully for the United States to “help us
to fight against the French aggression and feel that the terms of the Atlantic Charter are
put into immediate action at this moment.”117 For the May 29 writers especially, the
Atlantic Charter needed to become a living document, bringing tangible results for
survival and the preservation of independence.
While these appeals did not necessarily reach decision makers, other diplomatic
appeals to the Charter did. On May 22, the Deputy Premier of Lebanon dramatically
asked “if millions of dead in the war had been sacrificed in vain and the Atlantic Charter
was a scrap of paper.”118 On May 30, Quwatli sent an angry letter to new U.S. Secretary
of State Edward Stettinius, asking “where now is the Atlantic Charter and the Four
Freedoms?”119 The Egyptian Prime Minister sent a similar letter to Stettinius, tying the
situation in Syria to the Atlantic Charter and to postwar peace, prophesying that “unless
all the United Nations stand by the principles of the Atlantic Charter and by the basis on
which universal peace will be established in the near future the world cannot but doubt
that such a peace may be obtained and that justice may ever triumph.”120
These appeals to Stettinius found an unusually receptive audience because of his
presence in San Francisco at the conference attempting to translate the wartime anti-Axis
alliance into a permanent security organization. Syria and its allies successfully mobilized
significant pressure at the conference, publicizing the messy events in the Levant as an
116
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ugly image of what would happen without the Atlantic Charter’s guarantees for
sovereignty and independence. Quwatli’s letter explicitly referenced this, asking “what
can we think of San Francisco?” after questioning the Atlantic Charter and the Four
Freedoms.121 The Lebanese Foreign Minister appealed for aid at the conference based on
the Atlantic Charter, “and indicated it was up to the big powers to take a stand on their
fight for independence from French mandatory powers.”122 Syrian “princes” in Los
Angeles during a break from the conference also called, more gently, for U.S.
intervention. Two of the princes “wondered aloud…whether France is transgressing on
the spirit of the [Atlantic] charter with her landings of troops in Syria and The Lebanon,”
and another insisted that “the world is looking to America to carry out the purpose for
which she is waging a bloody war,” that purpose being “the protection of small nations
and the establishment of the Four Freedoms on a permanent basis.”123
More pressing for the United States, the spectacle in Syria threatened to upend the
conference and to mar the new anti-aggression organization from the outset with an
episode of blatant aggression. On May 31, Stettinius felt “the Levant crisis is ‘seriously
disrupting the atmosphere of the Conference’ in San Francisco.”124 Within the State
Department, Foy D. Henderson, director of the State Department’s new Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs, noted the hypocrisy of the Allies condoning French
aggression in Syria while formulating an anti-aggression pact at San Francisco, urging his
government to pressure the British and French in order to preserve the credibility of the
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new United Nations Organization.125 Henderson accepted the premises of the Syrian
appeals to the Charter, and although his influence was not likely a determining factor, it
does show the capacity for anticolonial rhetoric to become official reality.
In the aftermath of its order to stand down by the British, and adverse world
reaction, France ceded control over the Troupes Spéciales to the Syrian administration in
July.126 Under continued Syrian pressure, the British and French finally withdrew from
Syria on April 17, 1946, with April 17 still celebrated as Syria’s national day.127 While
the Atlantic Charter had not shamed the British, French, or Americans into treating Syria
as the sovereign nation Allied declarations claimed it to be, the Charter did provide a
useful recourse supplemented by other methods of more direct political pressure, such as
strikes and diplomatic maneuvers. Syrian activists placed those powers that accepted the
Charter in the position of either yielding to their own rhetoric or appearing blatantly
hypocritical in a diplomatic environment where the idealistic rhetoric of Allied
declaratory policy had created a certain image the Allies wanted to protect. By affirming
the Charter, Quwatli and others could also lay claim to the guarantees it offered for selfdetermination. Most importantly, though, the Charter served as a moral weapon, a high
ground to which Syrians and others could appeal even when their opponents far
outmatched them in military and political power. Even when French troops could run
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roughshod over Damascus in the middle of an international peace conference, Syrian
voices could still hold aloft the ideal of the Atlantic Charter.
***
Throughout the Second World War, Syrian nationalist leaders had exploited the
limited openings provided them, whether economic hardship generating discontent or
declarations of liberal international policy which enabled them to contrast Allied
declarations with colonial realities. In so doing, Syrians managed the assets they
possessed even though, until April 17, 1946, they did not maintain anything resembling
military dominance within the territory of Syria. Syrian independence did not result from
Allied magnanimity, but rather from Syrian use of the Allies’ declared magnanimity to
extract tangible concessions. The Atlantic Charter provided one of the tools to help
extract those concessions. In the Syrian case the Charter was certainly not an award of
rights from above. Instead, like independence, it was fought for and fought with.
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Chapter Four
“He had seen it work in the Philippines”1: The Philippines and the Atlantic Charter

When it was issued, the Atlantic Charter attracted almost no attention in the
Philippines. The Atlantic Conference aligning the United States with Britain and the
Conference’s joint warning to Japan aroused great interest, with clear implications for the
Philippines’ geopolitical position vis-à-vis Japan. However, after the Japanese invaded in
December 1941 and forced the Philippines’ self-government regime into U.S. exile in
1942, the Atlantic Charter suddenly entered the Philippine government’s vocabulary.
This chapter will look at Philippine use of the Charter before and after the outbreak of the
Pacific War, breaking roughly into periods of indifference and intense interest.
The chapter attempts to understand the Atlantic Charter’s appearance in
Philippine discourse from the Filipino perspective. Initial Philippine indifference to the
Charter rested on the fact that the promise of self-determination seemed fulfilled in the
archipelago’s self-governing, independence-in-waiting Commonwealth. As such,
Philippine leaders had little reason to point their domestic constitutents toward the
Atlantic Charter, nor much reason to press their colonial overlords with the document.
After the war broke out, the leaders largely lost the ability to communicate to their
constituents, and relied on their U.S. patrons for legitimacy as well as continuance. The
U.S. exile helps explain the Charter’s sudden appearance in Philippine rhetoric, and its
relatively sudden disappearance after the war shifted and the reoccupation began in 1944.
The Charter served as a useful tool for Philippine leaders to legitimize themselves in the
United States, with sympathetic world audiences, and with Filipinos within reach of U.S.
1
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radio and print propaganda. Due to Philippine President Manuel Quezon’s dominance of
Philippine politics by 1941, having co-opted all potential rivals and won election almost
unopposed, as well as his embodiment of the Philippine government-in-exile in 19421944, this chapter will focus almost exclusively on him and his closest advisors.2 A
paucity of sources available in the United States on Quezon’s competitors has also
restricted this work’s purview. Further research on other Philippine political actors is
needed.

Indifference to the Atlantic Charter: August-December 1941
The revelation of the Atlantic Conference garnered front-page coverage in
Philippine dailies, but the Atlantic Charter itself attracted little attention. The English
Manila Daily Bulletin ran an editorial on the document on August 16, but made no
mention of its third point about self-government.3 A subsequent editorial on the 23rd
portrayed the Charter as “a worthy platform for democracy’s defensive campaign,” but
made no reference to its having any application for the Philippines.4 The most prominent
response to the Charter came from the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, who
called it “one of the really great documents which mark the unconquerable upward
progress of humanity,” but whose importance lay mostly in its “potency to weaken the
allegiance of the German and other peoples to Nazi tyranny.”5 Monthly reports from the
U.S. consulate in Manila made no mention of the Atlantic Charter making any particular
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impact in the months after its appearance.6 Filipinos seemed not to find the Charter
particularly relevant.
To understand this reaction, especially in the context of the Indian response, one
needs to recognize the political position of the Philippines in 1941. By issuing the
Charter, President Roosevelt had committed to respect the governments chosen by
national territories such as the Philippines. The Philippines of 1941 stood in a unique
relationship to its sovereign colonial overlord. The legal and political intricacies of this
relationship help explain Filipino indifference to the Atlantic Charter, while that context
serves as a backdrop for understanding eventual Filipino engagement with the Atlantic
Charter once the Japanese war and occupation began on December 8, 1941.
The Atlantic Charter made little initial impact in the Philippines because the
United States appeared to have already committed itself irreversibly to decolonization in
the Philippines. The Philippine Independence Act of 1934 (commonly known as the
Tydings-McDuffie Act) provided for both Philippine self-determination and U.S. cession
of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for the
creation of a new regime, the Philippine Commonwealth, which would serve as a
transitional, semi-sovereign government between prior U.S. direct administration and the
future, fully independent and sovereign Philippine Republic. The Tydings-McDuffie Act
thus created a de facto and nearly de jure protectorate, in which Filipinos would govern
their domestic affairs while the United States retained control over Philippine external
policy. As one detractor of the arrangement noted, the Tydings-McDuffie Act gave “the
Filipino politicians full control of the islands but [left] full responsibility for them in the
Cf. Laurence E. Salisbury, “Monthly Political Report for August, 1941,” September 10, 1941, RG 59
Decimal Files Box 4074, NARA; Laurence E. Salisbury, “Monthly Political Report for September, 1941,”
October 10, 1941, RG 59 Decimal Files Box 4074, NARA.
6

105

hands of the American Government.”7 That critic might have more accurately said “full
control in the islands,” since “the terms of the [Act] permit of no doubt that the United
States [was] still sovereign” over the Philippines in the sense of its international
relations.8
Sovereignty within the archipelago seemingly translated into true selfdetermination, as the Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for the Commonwealth to be
formed by a constitution to be determined by Filipinos. Moreover, the Act required
approval by Filipinos in a plebiscite. Maximo Kalaw, a Filipino nationalist public
intellectual in the 1930s, supported the view that the Philippine Commonwealth
represented genuine self-determination.9 The idea of U.S. empire ending in the
Philippines in 1935 helped even consistent U.S. anti-imperialist voices such as the
Chicago Daily Tribune square the continued U.S. presence in the Philippines with an
anticolonial self-image. Hence in August 1941, the Tribune differentiated between the
U.S. concern in southeast Asia and the concerns of Britain, France, and the Netherlands,
depicting the Europeans as colonial and the Americans as non-colonial, concerned for the
independence of the Philippines rather than its own interests.10
The Philippines certainly acquired the trappings of decolonization, albeit
decolonization-in-process, after the passage of Tydings-McDuffie. Since the Act was
accepted by the Philippine government and approved in a plebiscite in 1935, its built-in
independence schedule fixed eventual independence on July 4, 1946. Particularly in light
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of British reluctance to offer any timetable for eventual withdrawal to Indian nationalists,
the firm U.S. commitment to devolve sovereignty represented an exception among
colonial powers and further reinforced Filipino perceptions of the Philippines as
relatively decolonized.11 On November 15, 1935, at his inauguration to the presidency of
the new Commonwealth, veteran nationalist leader Manuel Quezon saw the Philippine
and American flags raised to the same height, symbolizing international equality. 12
Philippine decolonization’s “in-process” designation qualified the Commonwealth
in important symbolic ways, reminding Filipinos that the United States retained
sovereignty. President Quezon received a nineteen-gun salute, rather than the 21 guns
obliged to a sovereign head of state. Also, while equal to its U.S. counterpart, the
Philippine flag could not fly without the corresponding U.S. flag.13 Anti-American
Japanese and Filipino rhetoric would make the most of these reminders of Filipino
subordination, but the U.S. commitment to scheduled independence and the
comparatively autonomous Philippine Commonwealth government helped defer or co-opt
Filipino contestation of U.S. sovereignty through the Commonwealth period.14 Hence,
when the Atlantic Charter promised self-determination for colonized territories, President
Roosevelt could point to U.S. devolution in the Philippines as a model for European

Arguing against its implementation, one author in 1941 acknowledged that “the political independence of
the Philippines, effective in 1946, is legally a closed issue.” Cf. Florence Horn, Orphans of the Pacific: The
Philippines (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941), 285. Likewise, Philippine Vice President Sergio
Osmeña asserted on July 4, 1941, that “independence is no longer an open, debatable issue among us, much
less in the halls of the American Congress, after the passage of the Independence Act.” Cf. James G.
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imperialists.15 Conversely, Filipinos could ignore or overlook the decolonizing impetus of
such a document because of relative satisfaction with U.S. action.16
Part of this preemption—the 1934 grant of internal self-government—also
provided a more basic distraction from the announcement of the Atlantic Charter. In midAugust 1941, the Philippine Commonwealth entered the campaign period for its second
election, the first having occurred in 1935, after the ratification of the Constitution
provided for in Tydings-McDuffie. Philippine attention gravitated toward President
Manuel Quezon, who pushed through constitutional reforms allowing him to pursue a
second term, rather than the U.S. President’s press release. After all, that press release
announced U.S. support for self-government, something most Filipinos felt they were
already practicing.17 As one news report noted, the 1941 presidential race “blotted out
from the Philippines’ view all the sordid happenings in Europe and Asia.”18
Quezon’s Nacionalista Party, holding its convention to nominate Quezon for his
second term as the Commonwealth’s president, dominated the headlines rather than the
Atlantic Charter. Although the Party did affirm the Charter during its convention, the
resolution it approved came at the very end of the convention and attracted almost no
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comment in the press.19 Even the Philippines’ Resident Commissioner, its quasidiplomatic representative in the United States, Joaquin Elizalde, made no mention of the
Charter in his radio address to Filipinos in the United States just a few days after the
Charter’s appearance. Instead, he focused on President Quezon’s upcoming birthday,
itself marked by a high-profile radio exchange with U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace.20
These radio talks also failed to mention the Charter.21
While the Philippine audience did not take much notice of the Atlantic Charter, it
had taken notice of the Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill.22 This conference,
as much as the Charter’s idealistic statements, had signaled the U.S. alignment with
Britain against the Axis powers, including Japan. As a manifestation of rising tensions
around the world amid the European war, the Conference proved relevant for Filipinos
fearful of the outbreak of war in the Pacific. Since the rapid German victories of spring
1940, the French and Dutch metropoles had lost most of their leverage over their
southeast Asian imperial holdings, allowing Japan to occupy French Indochina and to set
its sights on embattled Britain’s Malayan colonies and the Netherlands’ East Indies. This
geopolitical realignment placed the Philippines in the potential crossfire of an AngloDutch-Japanese conflict. As in western Europe against Germany, the United States had
by mid-1941 edged towards economic warfare against Japan on behalf of the western
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European Allies, beginning military readiness measures. Most notably for the
Philippines, the U.S. military buildup had occasioned the creation of a new U.S.
command based there in July 1941: the United States Army Forces in the Far East. This
command brought Douglas MacArthur, who had begun to build the Philippine
Commonwealth’s nascent army on Quezon’s request in 1935, back into command in
Manila.23 These events did command Filipinos’ attention amid their presidential
campaign.
In the course of his re-election campaign President Quezon would highlight the
impact of the global crisis on the Philippines. In so doing, Quezon would use and
emphasize very particular language relating to the decolonizing power, the United States,
and its role in global affairs. Accepting his party’s nomination for the presidency on
August 16, 1941, Quezon related the promise of Philippine independence to both the
global conflict and the United States. Quezon insisted that “if the democracies win the
war…the Philippines may enjoy the independence guaranteed by the United States”
promised in the Tydings-McDuffie Act.24 Quezon thus linked Filipino allegiance to the
United States, and Philippine opposition to the Axis, to Philippine independence.
Throughout the fall of 1941, Quezon would continually affirm Filipino loyalism
to the United States. For example, Quezon told Vice President Wallace on the August 19
radio broadcast that the Philippines were “with the United States in life and death.”25 In
light of the general sense that the United States would indeed cede sovereignty over the
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Philippines, loyalism to the United States could ironically be portrayed as proindependence.26 In the ambiguous international legal construct of the Commonwealth,
Filipinos affirming ties to the United States in turn affirmed the U.S. arrangement for
Philippine independence. Moreover, by highlighting the U.S. pledge to decolonize,
Philippine rhetoric could portray loyalism to the colonial power as in fact anticolonial, in
contrast to Japanese expansionism. In a September 28 interview, Elizalde affirmed that
“the fate of Philippine independence hinge[d] now upon the outcome of the war,” since
due to Axis maneuvers “the world does not seem as safe for small nations as it once
did.”27 When the Japanese invaded, Quezon could deploy this rhetoric to pronounce that
“you are, therefore, fighting with America because America is fighting for our
freedom.”28All of this coincided neatly with the U.S. anticolonial self-image and the
rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter. After the Japanes invasion, this rhetoric would
increasingly turn to the Atlantic Charter.
These statements did not cite the Atlantic Charter, but they linked the Philippine
political regime closely to the United States. Philippine leaders would only later deploy
the Atlantic Charter within this structure, but the form held true from the prewar period
into wartime. The rhetoric served a domestic purpose as well. By continually affirming
democratic idealism, Quezon could undercut his domestic and U.S. opponents, who
frequently criticized the clientelist style of his ruling Nacionalista Party and his own
publicly avowed disdain for multiparty democracy.29 The sheer volume of material
demonstrates how such seemingly non-nationalist subservience could form an
26
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autonomous, albeit moderate, discourse.30 It also points to the power of the U.S. narrative
of itself as a voluntary decolonizing power.31
After his decisive victory in the November 11 election, Quezon turned his rhetoric
toward a U.S. audience, where professions of Philippine loyalism could hope to secure
political goodwill for defining the wartime and postcolonial U.S.-Philippine
relationship.32 With tensions rising in the Pacific, Quezon walked a clever line affirming
loyalty in order to secure U.S. security guarantees, and then citing the U.S. security
guarantee to justify loyalism. Hence, in a November 15 radio address commemorating the
anniversary of the Commonwealth for U.S. and Filipino audiences, Quezon “informed
[Filipinos] that America had decided upon all-out defense of the Philippines in case a
general war breaks out in Asia,” and hence “called on all Filipinos to perform their full
share” in support of the U.S. military buildup in the Philippines, active since July.
Quezon offered this vision to Filipinos in terms of a generic democratic idealism,
claiming that the United States and the Philippines “gained the conviction that with our
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joint efforts liberty and democracy can successfully resist the aggression on our soil.”33 In
rhetoric aimed at Filipinos, Quezon spoke of generalized ideals but with a greater
emphasis on national security.
By contrast, when his speech turned to its U.S. audience, Quezon outlined a
vision of the military effort in indirect invocations of Rooseveltian rhetoric. Quezon
offered the typical “gratitude to America and the preservation of the liberty she has
granted us,” affirming the U.S. self-image as Philippine liberator and up-lifter.34
However, Quezon went on to argue for the Philippines’ role in the global war aims
outlined by Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter. He invoked anti-Axis slogans by speaking
of the Philippines joining “the gigantic effort of the United States to save democracy and
banish the totalitarians from the face of the earth.”35 Quezon insisted that Filipinos would
“do our share, for our country and for the United States, for liberty and for justice and for
the right of free men to sing and speak freely, to worship God as they please, to work
without the strain of compulsion in the pursuit of happiness and to live a way of life
chosen by themselves.” In this credo, Quezon reformulated Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms
(themselves the rhetorical roots of the Atlantic Charter), repeating the freedoms of speech
and worship and indirectly referencing the freedoms from want and fear by calling for
freedom to work and to live. Quezon appealed to Roosevelt personally in his speech,
affirming Filipinos’ “faith in the…spirit of the American people, their government and
their great President.”36 Despite deep division in the United States over Roosevelt’s
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leadership, addressing the U.S. public Quezon chose to adopt Rooseveltian rhetoric and
appeal to Roosevelt’s global project – summarized in the Atlantic Charter.
Looking back from 1942, anticolonial sympathizer Catherine Porter read
Quezon’s actions as having “brought the Philippines into the camp of powers opposing
the spread of aggression and the establishment of ‘new orders,’” such as Japan’s Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The tone of Roosevelt and Churchill’s declaration had
reaffirmed the U.S. self-image as anticolonial, which Porter then transposed onto
Philippine nationalism, assuming that the Charter must have “had significance for the
Filipinos.”37 What was more important than Filipino reactions, though, was Quezon’s
invocation of Roosevelt’s language, supposedly demonstrating that Filipinos shared
Roosevelt’s vision for the world. In fact, Quezon’s campaign speeches had very
indirectly invoked U.S.-inspired democratic idealism and had focused more on securing a
U.S. guarantee for Philippine security amid rising regional tensions. When speaking to
U.S. audiences, though, Quezon explicitly used Roosevelt-style rhetoric to demonstrate
Filipino loyalism not only to the United States but to Roosevelt’s vision.
The calculated nature of Quezon’s invocation of U.S. rhetoric, and his consistent
attempts to placate Filipino audiences as well as U.S. listeners, shone through in late
November 1941. As U.S.-Japanese negotiations stalled, Quezon lashed out against his
Filipino and U.S. critics. In a national broadcast, Quezon excoriated the tardiness of the
United States beginning war preparations in the Philippines, thus pre-empting criticism
that Quezon himself had perhaps not done enough to secure the Philippines. Instead, he
lashed out at critics such as the American Civil Liberties Union and its Philippine
counterpart which had lambasted his use of emergency powers to censor newspapers.
37
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Quezon identified these critics as “American imperialists” hampering his efforts to use
presidential prerogatives to secure the Philippines in a time of crisis.38 Although Quezon
backtracked in a December 1 statement, he had demonstrated his capacity for political
flexibility, using the language of anticolonialism to tar his domestic opponents and to turn
on U.S. officials momentarily in order to absolve himself of any potential policy failures
and, perhaps, to reaffirm his nationalist credentials.39
The Atlantic Charter made little impact on the Philippines at the time of its
release, likely due to U.S. interest in preserving its anticolonial self-image, but also due to
positive beliefs about ongoing U.S. decolonization in the Philippines. In light of this,
Filipinos’ attention was drawn more to their 1941 presidential election. However,
President Manuel Quezon’s re-election bid and his post-election statements operated in a
discourse that paralleled U.S. interests in the Atlantic Charter while still promoting his
own interests. Quezon highlighted Filipino loyalty to the United States, in part through
affirming U.S. “democratic ideals” and invoking Roosevelt-style language. The Atlantic
Charter itself was not the focus, perhaps because its proffered anticolonial rhetoric
already seemed fulfilled in Philippine decolonization. As U.S. self-representation,
however, the Charter paralleled Quezon’s flattering representations of the United States,
which he used to secure support from Filipinos and to attempt to extract commitments
from U.S. policymakers. When we place Quezon’s rhetoric in the context of the Atlantic
Charter, we see how Quezon used U.S. statements and his U.S. audience. Once the
Philippine Commonwealth was overwhelmed by a Japanese invasion force which also
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propounded an anticolonial ethos, the Atlantic Charter itself would reappear, used by
Quezon to promote his conception of Philippine interests.

Elizalde’s Pacific Charter: December 1941-April 1942
The Japanese invasion of the Philippines, coincident with the Pearl Harbor
attacks, prompted a shift in Philippine rhetoric. At first, Quezon fell back on the rhetoric
of loyalism which had characterized his speeches throughout his campaign for reelection. He also increasingly infused his speeches with references to the Philippines
fighting the war for broader, nobler goals as well. Immediately after war broke out,
Quezon cabled Roosevelt affirming Filipino loyalty “in testimony of their gratitude…and
because of their devotion to the cause of democracy and freedom.”40 In his speech on
December 19, appealing for aid from the United States to repel the invasion, Quezon
spoke of the Philippines fighting “to defend the cause of liberty and democracy,” and that
“we realize that our fate is inseparably linked with that of America and so long as
America is in the conflict we will continue to defend with our lives the honor and glory
of the Stars and Stripes.”41 In his December 31 inaugural address given on the island
fortress of Corregidor in Manila Bay, Quezon appealed to Filipinos to “rededicate
ourselves to the great principle of freedom and democracy for which our forefathers
fought and died” since “the present war is being fought for these same principles.”42
As the Japanese conquered the Philippines over the early months of 1942, and as
Quezon’s health worsened, his ability to project his voice ebbed. The importance of the
Philippine Commissioner in Washington increased, amplifying his voice to a U.S. public
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now riveted on the Philippines. At this point, the Atlantic Charter began to appear in
Philippine rhetoric. The Philippines’ Resident Commissioner in Washington, D.C.,
Joaquin “Mike” Elizalde, echoed Quezon’s speeches at first, emphasizing Philippine
gratitude to and solidarity with the United States in a January 3 piece released after the
fall of Manila to the Japanese, identifying the Philippine war effort with Quezon’s phrase,
the generic “human liberty and justice.”43
By late February, Elizalde fully invoked the Atlantic Charter, but he did so in
order to expose its weaknesses. In a little-reported speech in Philadelphia, which the
Washington Post nonetheless called “one of the most significant speeches since the
outbreak of the Pacific war,” Elizalde pointed out the need for the war to be fought for
universal freedom rather than merely for European freedom. Buoyed by the recent
collapses of British and Dutch forces in their Southeast Asian colonies, contrasted to the
U.S.-Philippine cooperative war effort continuing to fight off the Japanese on Bataan,
Elizalde valorized Philippine democracy and self-determination against the implicit nonfreedom of other European colonies in the region. In order to win the war, the warring
Allies needed to declare whether the war would mean “merely freedom and democracy
for Americans, Britons, Dutch and other European peoples, or whether it is freedom for
all concerned.” As the Post summarized, “we must make the Asiatics understand they are
not pawns but partners in this struggle” by clarifying the universalism of the Atlantic
Charter in a new document, a ‘Pacific Charter.’44
Elizalde would return to the need for the Charter’s values, especially selfdetermination, to be applied universally, throughout the spring of 1942. In a March 9

43
44

Joaquin M. Elizalde, “Fiercer Struggle in Philippines Seen,” New York Times, January 3, 1942.
“A Pacific Charter,” Washington Post, February 21, 1942.

117

radio address, Elizalde again proposed a Pacific charter in order to “[carry] for the
peoples of the Pacific and Asia the guarantees put into the Atlantic charter proclaimed
last year” so as to counteract Asian ambivalence over having to “decide between
supporting an archaic system of imperialism or accepting a cruel future of Japanese
exploitation under the false slogan ‘Asia for the Asiatics.’”45 In a speech to Democratic
Party donors on March 23, Elizalde again brought up the need to motivate colonized
Asians against Japan by offering them something better than imperialism, namely true
democracy.46 In neither of these addresses did Elizalde explicitly relate the Atlantic
Charter to the Philippines, instead offering an external Philippine anticolonial vision for
Asia, assuming the Philippines as an already-decolonized polity.
In an April 1942 article for the anticolonial journal Amerasia, Elizalde linked the
Philippine experience directly to the Charter. Elizalde claimed that the Philippines hoped
to duplicate its experience of decolonization all across Asia, since the Philippine
resistance to Japan was rooted in “friendship for and gratitude to the people of the United
States,” giving Filipinos “something to fight for.” Elizalde emphasized the need for the
war’s values to be recognized as universal, not merely European or American, reminding
his American readers that “above all, we are fighting to protect the freedom and
democracy which are as much a part of our spirit as they are of yours.”47 Elizalde
recognized the importance of such universalism for the Atlantic Charter to be seen as
valid, and applauded Roosevelt’s Washington Day speech in which he “stressed that the
Atlantic Charter applies to the whole world,” “held forth the four freedoms…to the
people of the Pacific,” and “declared in all solemnity that a prime objective of this war is
“Filipinos Warns Oppressed Asia May Turn on Us,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 10, 1942.
“Democratic Women Hear J.M. Elizalde,” Washington Post, March 24, 1942.
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the establishment of the right of self-determination for all people,” in opposition to
Churchill’s September 1941 limitation of the Charter to Europe. Recognizing the damage
done by Churchill’s limitation, Elizalde reiterated his call for a Pacific Charter to “assert
unequivocally the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they
will live, and should guarantee social and economic justice for all,” necessarily implying
that the Atlantic Charter had failed to do so. Only with such a specification could the
Allies show that “this war is not being fought for the furtherance of imperialistic
supremacy, but for the principles of liberty and the right of all men to live,” principles
which the colonialist West “must understand” to be “valid in any part of the world.”48
Elizalde’s speeches drew attention to the deficiencies of Western colonial
policies, implicitly highlighting the excellence of U.S. policy in the Philippines and hence
the legitimacy of Philippine loyalism. His calls for a Pacific Charter anticipated more
radical voices among U.S. and global anticolonial movements, who embraced the idea of
the United States committing itself more firmly to even more directly anticolonial
promises.49
When the Japanese conquest of Bataan and eventually Corregidor forced Quezon
to flee to the United States, Philippine evocations of the Atlantic Charter backed away
from exposing its deficiencies and more toward emphasizing its legitimacy embodied in
the decolonizing Philippine Commonwealth. As Quezon took the lead in Philippine
rhetoric after his relocation to the metropole, Elizalde’s calls for more explicit U.S.
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guarantees to Asian anticolonialists faded into the background in favor of Quezon’s use
of the Charter to legitimize his own loyalist regime. These elements had been present in
Elizalde’s work, but by branching out into greater demands on the United States, Elizalde
had aligned his rhetoric with the broader anticolonial movement, and especially its more
radical elements.

Quezon’s Atlantic Charter: May 1942-1943
In failing health under the duress of Japanese bombardment of the Corregidor
island fortress, Quezon left the Philippine front in late March 1942, disappearing in
transit before reappearing in Australia and then finally relocating to Washington, D.C.
Upon arriving in Washington on May 13, Quezon organized a government-in-exile,
presenting the Philippines as a sovereign state, like other governments-in-exile such as
Poland, France, or Yugoslavia.50 As such, Quezon sought to promote the Philippines as a
member of the Pacific War Council, the largely ceremonial conferences of the heads-ofstate of the ‘United Nations’ states waging war against Japan.51 Joining the Council
would cement de facto recognition of Philippine sovereignty, hence solidifying Filipino
faith in “the American people and in those principles of government which all inspired
democratic peoples are today fighting to preserve,” as a Filipino-American group argued
upon Quezon’s arrival.52
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The Declaration by United Nations, which affirmed the Atlantic Charter, served
as the mechanism for the Philippines to formally join the United Nations alliance and
then join the Pacific War Council, solidifying its image (if not reality) as a sovereign
state. President Roosevelt proved more than amenable to this course of action, just as he
had pushed the British to allow India to sign the Declaration as an ally in an effort to prod
it towards recognizing Indian sovereignty. By such a costless action, the United States
could portray itself as a benevolent decolonizing agent, elevating the Philippines to de
facto sovereignty to promote its anticolonial bona fides. 53 The administration notified
Quezon of its assent on June 12 and prepared a lavish publicity event at the White House
for Flag Day on June 14, in which Quezon would sign the Declaration along with Mexico
– the first new adherents to the Declaration and the United Nations alliance since its
promulgation in January.54
In contrast to the Indian signature of the Declaration in January, which the British
insisted on downplaying, the Philippine signature was universally seen as a recognition of
de facto independence. The press saw the adherence as a U.S. disposition “to regard the
Philippines as an independent and sovereign country.”55 Indeed, U.S. officials discussing
the possibility of the move recognized that it “is equivalent to formal recognition by us at
this time of the independent status of the Philippines.”56 Quezon himself privately
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affirmed that “this signing of the United Nations pact is a recognition of us as a separate
nation.”57 The subsequent admission of the Philippines to the Pacific War Council
confirmed this status: the New York Times depicted the Philippines’ June 17 admission as
“recognition [of the Philippines] as a sovereign nation.”58 Likewise, Quezon emphasized
the importance of the Council less for any policymaking procedure – in this it was
“largely a farce” – than because “it was at least desirable to have the Philippines
represented on it to show the world that they had equality with other nations of the
Pacific.”59
These largely symbolic gestures would become lynchpins of Quezon’s selfrepresentation and of his representation of the Philippines in regards to the Atlantic
Charter, both in and of itself and as a component of the Declaration by United Nations.
Throughout this period, Philippine officials and U.S. media emphasized that Quezon
“embodied” the Philippines, much as Charles de Gaulle claimed to “embody” France
after its capitulation in 1940.60 Therefore, while the Japanese may have conquered the
Philippines, they had not conquered Quezon, and “wherever Quezon is, there will be the
free Philippines, and there will also be the pledge that the tomorrow of liberty will be
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realized.”61 That is, in his tie to the United States, Quezon represented the promise of
independence through loyalty to the United States.
Quezon valorized his own role in representing the Philippines in the United
States, and presented his own actions as representing the collective will of the
Philippines. On June 20, Quezon sent a public telegram to General MacArthur in which
he relayed that by his signature of the Declaration by United Nations, “the distinct and
separate identity of the Philippines as a nation has been recognized,” validating his own
personal quest to achieve “the practical recognition of the rights of nationhood for my
people.”62 A day earlier, Quezon had begun plans to record a commentary on a short film
to be distributed in South America and occupied countries emphasizing “that America
fulfills its promises and that the Philippines were happy under American rule.”63 Quezon
presented himself as the personification of the Philippine people, for whom he flattered
his U.S. hosts with the account of U.S. benevolence. In April 1943, Quezon would repeat
the personification in a Times Sunday magazine piece, reiterating that “in the name of the
Philippines, I am a signatory of the Atlantic Charter.”64
Quezon needed to portray the Declaration as an affirmation of Philippine
independence and then tie the document to himself in order to validate his own regime in
the face of Japanese competition. Conquest and defeat always deprive governments of
some level of legitimacy, and must have done so doubly for the Commonwealth leaders.
Not only had they collaborated with the United States, the colonial power, in the interest
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of security, but this security had not even held. Moreover, the Japanese government
framed its invasion and occupation in the same terms as the United States had done,
namely of liberation. Threateningly, the Japanese held out the possibility of declaring the
Philippines independent after completing their conquest, placing the supposedly proindependence Commonwealth leaders in a difficult position. Quezon realized as much
and expressed it shortly after his arrival in the United States, confiding that “the great
political danger” to the Commonwealth in exile was “that the Japanese may declare the
independence of the Philippines themselves.”65 In light of this conscious admission by
Quezon, we should analyze Philippine Atlantic Charter rhetoric not only as flattering
U.S. patrons but also grasping for legitimacy to justify the Commonwealth’s existence
and claims to sovereignty. Quezon’s speeches, reproduced in newspapers and broadcast
over U.S. radio, could reach the Philippines by radio.66
Pursuant to bolstering their own legitimacy, Quezon and other Philippine officials
in the exiled government used the anticolonial promises of the Atlantic Charter to
legitimize the Philippine Commonwealth. In his petition on June 10 for the Philippines to
adhere to the Declaration by United Nations, Quezon tied the Declaration directly to the
Atlantic Charter to justify Philippine adherence. In particular, Quezon identified a
particularly Philippine tie to the document, claiming that Filipinos were “wholeheartedly
devoted to liberty and fully subscribe to the principles set forth in…the Atlantic
Charter.”67 Such rhetorical flourish both flattered Quezon’s U.S. sponsors and echoed
Elizalde’s rhetoric from before Quezon’s arrival in the United States. Quezon’s speech on
65
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August 9, 1942, broadcast on CBS, emphasized the Charter’s universalism and its
anticolonialism: “the Atlantic Charter is a world-wide charter” and “it is a charter of
freedom for the peoples of Asia and all the Far East.”68
Where Elizalde called for a Pacific Charter to make the Atlantic Charter’s
universalism more explicit, Quezon affirmed the Atlantic Charter itself, in line with
Roosevelt’s own rhetoric on the document. Quezon “regretted that the Atlantic Charter is
so named” since “too many persons have fallen into the error of believing that it applies
only to those who live beside the Atlantic Ocean,” rebuking both Churchill’s limited
view of the Charter and those who pushed Roosevelt for a new commitment. Quezon and
others argued that the Philippines represented the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter, a
sort of precursor to the Charter itself. Quezon implied as much in his speech on August 9,
noting that the Charter’s promises made “sense to Americans as well as to my
countrymen,” implying that Americans had already applied the promises there.69 This
argument attempted retroactively to appropriate the popularity and legitimacy of the
Atlantic Charter onto the Commonwealth regime. That is, by attaching itself to the
Charter, the Philippine government-in-exile both supported the Charter itself and used the
Charter’s popularity to burgeon support for the government-in-exile.
The new line on the Philippines as the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter began to
appear in late 1942. Quezon’s chaplain voiced his opinion that “the principles of today’s
Atlantic Charter were carried out years ago in the case of the Philippines.”70 A ceremony
held in Washington in November marked the seventh anniversary of the Philippine
Commonwealth, highlighting the legitimacy of Quezon’s exiled government. On this
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occasion, Quezon explicitly linked his legitimacy with the Atlantic Charter, claiming that
“years before the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated, America was
already applying those principles in actual practice.”71 Quezon spoke of hearing of the
Atlantic Charter in 1941, when he saw
not something brand new, untested, visionary, but rather a reaffirmation of faith in what
already had been done in the Philippines before my very eyes. We already knew the
meaning of the Atlantic Charter, for our own country had been the testing ground for the
practical solution of the problems that must be met in achieving the God-given right of
the people’s freedom.72

By emphasizing that the Atlantic Charter found fulfillment in the Philippine
decolonization process, Quezon valorized his own regime as a legitimate example of selfdetermination. However, he also performed a service to the United States, attempting to
thwart charges of hypocrisy over its alliance with imperial Britain and its refusal to
pressure Britain into committing to withdraw from its empire – such as in India, where
Gandhi and Nehru sat in jail. In answer to such critics as these, who disregarded U.S.
platitudes, Quezon implored “anyone who would consider the Atlantic Charter illusory
and impractical” to consider “the record of the Philippines.”73 Vice President Sergio
Osmeña, who took a more public role as Quezon’s health failed under the pressure of
tuberculosis after 1942, largely continued Quezon’s rhetoric. In a prominent address in
May 1943, Osmeña claimed that “long before the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter,
the Philippines had already pledged herself to follow the cause of democracy and peace,”
in contrast to Quezon, who drew attention to the United States fulfilling the Charter.74

Manuel L. Quezon, “Quezon Says Ideal Is Set for World,” New York Times, November 15, 1942.
Quezon, quoted in Frederick R. Barkley, “Roosevelt Calls Philippines Model for Independence,” New
York Times, November 16, 1942.
73
Quezon, quoted in Barkley, “Roosevelt Calls Philippines Model for Independence”; later, cf. “Avenge
Bataan! Romulo Appeal to News Group,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 8, 1943.
74
Osmeña, “The United Nations and the Philippines,” 25.
71
72

126

By claiming that the Philippines exemplified the sincerity of the Atlantic Charter,
Philippine leaders praised the trustworthiness of the U.S. government. Quezon’s chaplain
tried to anticipate skeptics by insisting that “freedom…was not merely a catch phrase to
which Americans paid lip service,” but rather Philippine independence “was something
real, something rapidly coming into fruition right in their own islands.”75 Osmeña spoke
of the United States both “promulgating an altruistic policy, ‘the Philippines for the
Filipinos,’” deliberately mirroring the Japanese “Asia for the Asiatics” slogan, “and then
following it to the letter and the spirit.”76 The Philippines’ auditor-general claimed the
Filipinos continued to fight after the overwhelming Japanese invasion, trusting in
Roosevelt’s pledge “to redeem the independence of the Philippines…as their guiding
spirit.”77 In emphasizing U.S. faithfulness, Philippine Commonwealth voices
commutatively validated their own trust in U.S. promises to liberate the Philippines, and
hence the Commonwealth’s existence as a U.S. entity.
Beyond simply praising U.S. policy, Philippine rhetoric also offered their
decolonization process as a model for other European empires in Asia. Quezon’s chaplain
argued “that what had been done for the Philippines can and must be done for all nations,
whatever their race, religion or color.”78 In his Commonwealth Day speech, Quezon
thundered that “what has been done cooperatively by the United States and the
Philippines can be done by the United Nations in the world of tomorrow, throughout the
whole Southwest Pacific and wherever men yearn for liberty and the right to work out
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their own destiny.”79 In a New York Times piece in April 1943, Quezon again reiterated
the point, arguing that the Philippine experience of U.S. Atlantic Charter idealism should
serve as “the blueprint of the practical solution for working out the future destiny of
dependent peoples after the war.”80
In citing the Philippine example, Philippine leaders explicitly called for a
gradualist process of decolonization. Osmeña directly urged “these dependent peoples,
who hunger for justice, freedom, and happiness” to look to the Philippines as a sign that
independence “can be attained, not by distrust, bloodshed, and violence, but by
friendship, understanding, and collaboration.”81 Osmeña’s conservative articulation
would certainly please a U.S. audience of academics more than a Gandhian call to noncooperation. The gradualism of the Philippines model fit with President Roosevelt’s
vision for decolonization. In his address following Quezon’s praise of the Atlantic
Charter, Roosevelt emphasized that decolonization must proceed after “a period of
improvement of the physical and economic status of the peoples involved, and…a period
of training of them for ultimate independence.”82 Mexican President Manuel Ávila
Camacho, also speaking at the event, pressed but a little farther than Roosevelt,
describing the Atlantic Charter as “a guarantee that the principles of gradual elimination
of colonies will emerge from this conflict stronger and more definite than ever.”83 While
this paternalistic vision did not differ radically from that of European colonizers,
Roosevelt’s insistence on eventual independence as in the Philippines greatly concerned
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contemporary European leaders and offered hope to nationalists. Recognizing that this
understanding of the Atlantic Charter was their best option among the Great Powers,
Philippine leaders seized upon it and promoted it as a way to hasten wider
decolonization. Moreover, the model placed the Philippines at its head, making it an
attractive attribute for Philippine leadership to broadcast.
Philippine leaders used the Atlantic Charter as a rhetorical tool to validate their
choice to align with the United States, despite its defeat in 1941-1942. During its exile in
the United States throughout 1942-1943, the Commonwealth government’s authorities
returned to the Atlantic Charter to flatter the United States and, as a U.S. dependency, to
validate itself. However, in promoting a universal reading of the Charter and tying the
Charter explicitly to decolonization, Philippine leaders presented a vision of the postwar
world different from that of European “United Nations.” As the Philippines became the
first Asian colony to gain internationally-recognized independence after the war ended
and as the Cold War descended, its particular brand of anticolonialism would assume
greater importance.
***
The Commonwealth government exited the limelight in 1944 as President Quezon
faded away under the debilitation of tuberculosis and the war turned in favor of the
Allies. Before his illness became more serious, Quezon began to evoke the Atlantic
Charter in looking toward the future and a postcolonial Philippines. In particular, he
invoked the Charter’s social and economic points to argue that the United States ought to
help rehabilitate the Philippines “economically and financially,” as a tangible
“application of the Atlantic Charter.” Again couched in terms of honor and trust, Quezon
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wrote that in so doing “the American people and the Filipino people can keep faith with
the American and Filipino boys who died on Bataan and Corregidor.”84 Osmeña also
called on the world to retain the Atlantic Charter beyond the crisis of war, so that after the
war, “let us live up to it forever.”85
Osmeña inherited the mantle to fulfill this Atlantic Charter rhetoric in August
1944 when Quezon died in Saranac Lake, New York.86 Shortly afterward, Osmeña waded
ashore on Leyte alongside General Douglas MacArthur. A few months later, with the
reoccupation complete, MacArthur relinquished control over the islands to its civilian
leadership. On the occasion, Osmeña honored Quezon, highlighting the fact that “he
proclaimed Philippine adherence to the Atlantic Charter and to the principle of collective
security.”87 “Collective security” referred to the latest iteration of the Philippines’
identification as an adherent of the Declaration by United Nations. As a signatory, the
Philippines received an invitation to the United Nations Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, subsequently becoming a founding member of the United
Nations Organization.88
After these brief references, the Atlantic Charter again faded from Philippine
discourse. The Charter had served its function for the period in exile. After the war, with
independence imminent, the Charter’s promises of self-determination seemed fulfilled or
irrelevant. The Charter would live on with one of its loudest promoters, the boyish Carlos
Romulo, who continued to play a role in Philippine politics and society into the 1980s.
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Romulo, a prewar newspaper journalist, editor, and publisher, had joined the
Commonwealth government during the war as a communications officer. He then
followed Quezon to the United States in 1942.89 He had opened his 1943 book
celebrating the U.S.-Philippine alliance with the Atlantic Charter: “To millions all over
the earth, of all colors and creeds, this democratic premise of the Atlantic Charter was the
beginning of a dream, a hope, and a prayer. But to Franklin Delano Roosevelt the Charter
was an actuality. He knew it could be accomplished on a world-wide scale. He had seen it
work in the Philippines.”90 As Roosevelt and Quezon passed from the stage, Romulo
continued to return to the Charter to serve different purposes for different audiences. In
this, he continued the Philippine tradition from 1942-1943.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion: The Three-Fifths World

As a press release, the Atlantic Charter has fared remarkably well. Most
statements released by government leaders, even those of major geopolitical powers, fade
into obscurity amid the pile of papers generated by the bureaucracy of administration. Yet
the Atlantic Charter came amid an unprecedented global crisis, with two major wars
raging at each end of the Eurasian landmass. In a sense, both Churchill and Roosevelt
failed at the Atlantic Conference. Churchill failed to secure U.S. entry into the WestEurasian war, and Roosevelt failed to cow Japan into a negotiated settlement in the
Pacific. Hitler solved Churchill’s problem on December 11 by formalizing the undeclared
naval war Germany and the United States had fought since 1940. This only came after
Roosevelt had to declare war in the theater he had been least concerned about. The
Conference’s failure in this sense was eclipsed by what both leaders perceived as the
meeting’s least momentous development: a press release about postwar goals. As
revealed in the national and transnational histories of rights-talk, however, documents
take on a life of their own.1
The Atlantic Charter certainly did so, but it took different lives in different places.
Contrary to many depictions of the Charter, it did not generate a singular, global,
anticolonial response even upon its appearance.2 Only by reducing the various responses
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to their lowest common denominator (anticolonialism) can we speak this way. Even if,
broadly aggregated, the reaction to the Charter was a recurrence of the Wilsonian
moment – the hopes of the colonial world pinned on Anglo-American idealism – it was a
brief and inconsequential recurrence. The credulous among the 1941 anticolonialists
experienced the same arc from hope to disillusionment as in 1919. Whereas Wilson
waited until arriving in Paris to make clear he would not apply self-determination outside
Europe, Churchill offered that clarification less than a month after the Charter appeared.3
Unlike 1919, no major anticolonial movement sprung even indirectly from the Charter’s
appearance: the framers of the war’s largest contemporary movement, Quit India,
avowedly disregarded the Atlantic Charter.4
Neither the Atlantic Charter nor its authors instigated a constellation of
anticolonial activism during the Second World War. Reorienting our perspective, we can
see that a constellation of anticolonial activists used the Charter to pursue their own ends,
principally focusing on the Charter’s clauses on self-determination. Viewed from this
perspective, the resurgence of self-determination in global discourse and international
law after 1941 appears not as a process driven by the West but rather as a result driven by
anticolonial forces, both in colonies and in metropoles. This discourse framed the
arguments about the colonized world during the intertwined processes of the Cold War,
decolonization, and postcolonial conflict, from Berlin and Biafra to Hungary and Hanoi.
While the “Wilsonian moment” of 1919 introduced and globalized self-determination, the
Atlantic Charter signified self-determination’s “[entrenchment] in the global order,” as
3
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would be seen in its incorporation into the Human Rights Covenants and decisive prodecolonization UN resolutions in the 1960s.5

Local and Global
The cases detailed in the three previous chapters reveal several important
distinctions. First of all, initial reactions to the appearance of the Atlantic Charter differed
immensely, largely in relation to local political circumstances. In India, amid the political
stasis of the August Offer and a moribund Congress, saddled with Gandhi’s largely
unsuccessful personal satyagraha campaign, the Charter appeared as a bombshell. In the
Philippines, also colonized by a signatory to the Charter, it made little impact at first. The
difference lay in the varying legitimacy accorded to the regimes governing the two
colonies: whereas the U.S. commitment to eventual decolonization had been made clear
and meaningful power transferred to Filipinos, in India considerable distrust divided the
British government, the Government of India, Indian nationalists, and even pro-British
Indians. Whereas the Atlantic Charter seemed irrelevant to Filipinos largely content to
wait until independence in 1946, in India the Charter appeared as only another example
of bad faith on the part of Britain, and particularly Churchill. The Charter repeated and
exacerbated the unhappy reaction to the August Offer, in whose shadow the Charter
operated in Indian anticolonial discourse. Philippine disinterest in the Charter reflected its
overlords’ largely more satisfactory commitment, the Tydings-McDuffie Act. With such
a grandiose statement as the Atlantic Charter, the reputations of the signatories mattered,
as they would for future entries into international law.

Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 5; Laing, “Relevance of the Atlantic Charter for a New World Order,”
311.
5
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The Syrian non-reaction to the Charter in some ways mirrored the Philippine
reaction, but it likely reflected the political and military confusion on the ground. The
Free French government had, after all, declared Syrian and Lebanese independence upon
its entry into war against its Vichy rivals. Whether Syrian activists regarded these
promises as genuine or not remains unclear without consulting Arabic-language
newspapers and archives, but any confidence they had in the French promises likely came
more from their backing by the British. After all, by the late 1930s Syrian nationalists had
little faith left in their French interlocutors, who had reneged on the 1936 treaty
promising a negotiated decolonization along the lines of that in the Philippines. The
resumption of politicized bread riots by early 1942 indicates that Syrian nationalists
would not simply wait for the new French authorities to fulfill their promises.
For these Syrian leaders and the groups they mobilized, like the Philippine
Commonwealth leaders in exile in 1942, the Charter proved more helpful after 1941 than
before. For Syrians, the Charter provided a rhetoric which appealed to the world at large,
especially the rising United States. The Charter could validate the French declaration of
independence from 1941, making it useful both to the pro-French Taj al-Din eager to
show his own independence and to the National Bloc once it gained power in 1943, eager
to protect itself from French infringement. The Philippine Commonwealth leaders
mirrored Taj al-Din, but with an eye to grander implications. As Quezon and Osmeña
highlighted Philippine independence, they valorized their own regime, just as Taj al-Din
did. They also presented the Philippines as an example of Atlantic Charter sincerity to
colonized people all around the world. Whereas the Philippine leaders depicted U.S.
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Atlantic Charter sincerity, Syrian leaders of all stripes tested it, requesting U.S.
recognition and support in light of increasing challenges from the French after 1943.
For these Philippine and Syrian leaders, the January 2, 1942, Declaration by
United Nations had reinforced the Atlantic Charter’s place in the wartime anti-Axis
alliance. Signing the Declaration became a concrete assertion of sovereignty, validating
for the leaderships of these two polities the Atlantic Charter’s recognition of their
sovereignty and self-determination. In India, the Declaration generated an opposite
reaction, in line with the disillusionment generated by Churchill’s repudiation of the
Charter’s applicability to India.6 Followed in early 1942 by the failure of the Cripps
Offer, British duplicity seemed to have reached new lows for Indian Congressmen, other
anticolonialists, and even some pro-British Indians.7 Whereas Syrian nationalists could
appeal to the United States and Great Britain in the face of French power in 1943 and
1945, the Congress faced similarly repressive measures from the British after their Quit
India motion passed in 1942, but without international diplomatic help. Syrians and
Filipinos retained the Atlantic Charter as a rhetoric to appeal to the United States, but
Congress had rejected it since 1941, in light of British insincerity. Even if they had done
so, President Roosevelt showed no inclination publicly to challenge his British ally on the
sensitive question of India.
Thus, although the citation of a particular document unites these three cases, few
other features bring them together. The extent of the use of the document depended
largely on the amount of credibility assigned to its originators. Hence, for Indians, its
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source in the arch-imperialist Churchill rendered the document nearly dead on arrival,
which he made sure of after September 9, 1941. For Filipinos under a countdown to
independence, U.S. credibility made the document nearly obsolete, until the
Commonwealth needed it to validate itself. For Syrians, the Charter provided an
alternative source of legitimacy located in the great powers identified as key allies against
the French. In each case, use of the document conformed largely to local contexts and
needs rather than to a global narrative. In as much as actors in each case study affirmed a
global narrative, its trajectory affirmed their own route to independence and control of the
state.
The Atlantic Charter entered complex political situations, where anticolonial
audiences appropriated it in equally complex ways. In its global-ness, the Charter truly
affirmed the local: its use spanned the globe, but actors articulated it into local contexts.
Sharing a source material, produced by an Anglo-American diplomatic exchange,
anticolonial activists made that material meaningful in their own ways and for their own
purposes.

Transnationalism
Anticolonial activists made the Charter meaningful in part by using it across
national boundaries, especially in the metropoles of their colonial states. While Atlantic
Charter citations declined in India, Indian anticolonialists used the Charter repeatedly in
their appeals in Britain and the United States.8 President Roosevelt certainly saw the
Charter as an effective tool in securing the loyalty of Syrian-Americans, urging the
8
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Syrian Orthodox archbishop of Toledo in 1942 to “render a further greater service by
taking advantage of every opportunity ‘to make it clear to your co-religionists, friends
and relatives remaining in the Near East’” that the United States and its allies intended to
restore “peace, liberty and justice…upon the firm basis of the four freedoms and the
Atlantic Charter.”9 The Syrian- and Lebanese-American community in the United States
supported President Roosevelt in his 1944 re-election campaign, seeking to goad him into
more explicitly supporting Syrian and Lebanese independence.10 As the case study above
outlined, the Philippine use of the Atlantic Charter rested almost entirely on its efficacy
with a U.S. audience. The Philippine Commonwealth only turned to the Charter once it
arrived in the United States.
Anticolonial actors outside of the case study countries also used the Atlantic
Charter. Citing the Charter as a universal value statement, writers, speakers, and
policymakers would work across boundaries in order to influence outcomes. This
occurred most prominently around the crisis in Lebanon, as the pan-Arab movement
gathered steam amid the war and encouraged independent Arab states to stand in
solidarity with colonized brethren. The Egyptian Prime Minister Mustapha Nahas
expressed his faith in Franco-British declarations about Levantine independence in terms
of the Atlantic Charter, subtly urging an amendment to France’s tough line on Lebanon in

9
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November 1943.11 U.S. letter writers pledged solidarity with Syria in terms of the
Atlantic Charter, lambasting the French removal of the Lebanese government as
“contrary to the Atlantic Charter and the first freedom of self-government” as well as
against France’s own declaration of Lebanon’s independence. The same writer saw in the
episode global significance, “testing the sincerity of the Allied Nations’ promises of
independence and self-government, the Atlantic Charter, and the four freedoms.”12
Another letter writer saw a clear, legal obligation for the United States to intervene “as
one of the two principals of the Atlantic Charter,” a position which would “win the good
will and gratitude of the peoples of the Near and Middle East.”13
The Philippines, with its close connection to the United States, proved a hub for
transnational comment at the same time as Filipinos self-referentially commented on the
world situation. Manuel Quezon, at first reluctant to speak out on the situation in India
after his arrival in the United States in May 1942, eventually wrote to Gandhi and Nehru
urging them against pursuing the Quit India movement.14 His high-profile speeches and
writings in 1942 and 1943 did not reference the Quit India movement, but Quezon’s
support for peaceful, gradual colonial reform and validation of the sincerity of the
Atlantic Charter countered the political calculus behind Gandhi’s rejection of British
promises. Privately, Quezon also had a testy exchange with the British Ambassador to the
United States, Lord Halifax, in which he contrasted Philippine trust in U.S. rhetoric with
Indian distrust of British announcements. Although he left the comparison unfounded, the
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example of the Atlantic Charter would seem to support his case.15 The Chinese
philosopher Mei Yi-pao assigned great significance to Philippine decolonization,
predicting that “the lesser Asiatic peoples will look to the United States…in part under
suggestion of the Atlantic Charter’s avowal of self-determination,” validated by “what
this country has done in the Philippines.”16 The Manila Post protested against the Dutch
reconquest of Indonesia, citing the “doctrine of self-determination for subject
peoples…reiterated by the Atlantic Charter.”17 Likewise, Indonesian activists used the
Philippine-Atlantic Charter example to put their own situation in perspective, arguing that
“American respect for the Atlantic charter [in Philippine independence in 1946]
contrasted with the Dutch ‘endeavor to crush it.’”18
Indian activists used the Syrian example to excoriate British hypocrisy. V.K.
Krishna Menon, the head of the Congress’s India League in London, cited Britain’s
commitment to honor Syrian independence as an example of its willingness to dissolve
all empires but its own.19 In keeping with Indian disaffection for the Atlantic Charter,
however, this transnational rhetoric did not cite the Charter. Syrians did not use India as a
counterexample as Indians used it and as Filipinos used India. However, Syrians did use
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the Atlantic Charter increasingly in the interests of opposing Zionism, citing U.S. support
for Jewish settlement in Palestine as a violation of the Atlantic Charter.20
In these ways, the use of the Atlantic Charter in three distinct colonial
environments also transcended their own national boundaries. For the most part, though,
citations of the Charter remained firmly rooted in localized conflicts and desires. The
Atlantic Charter’s crossing of boundaries largely mimicked the colonial boundaries it
challenged, with Indians deploying the Charter in Britain and Filipinos deploying it in the
United States. However, as the ambiguity of the Philippine example indicates, these uses
did not always indicate opposition. Instead, Filipinos affirmed their U.S. “allies” via the
Atlantic Charter while Indians critiqued their British rulers through the same document.
Inasmuch as the Charter used a universal language, it opened the doors to transnational
rhetoric. The infrequency of such transnationalism only further attests to the highly
pragmatic attitude many activists had for the document: they found it useful to appeal to
specific audiences in pursuit of their own goals.

The Legacy of the Atlantic Charter
Beyond its afterlife throughout the Second World War, the Atlantic Charter has
continued to echo through the Twentieth Century. In light of general disillusionment with
the British and the Americans, and the ineffectiveness of citing the document, the Charter
has not resonated as much in India as in Syria and the Philippines. Its resonance in the
20
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rhetoric of each state’s policymakers has mirrored general trends in the international
history of the century, making the Atlantic Charter a useful starting place for looking at
later processes of decolonization amid the Cold War.
The reformist discourse of Cold War liberalism, urging Europe and the United
States to forsake colonialism and racism in order to appeal to global subaltern groups,
finds a precedent in Atlantic Charter rhetoric.21 George Wadsworth, U.S. consul-general
in Syria and Lebanon, noted the danger of isolating Arab leaders who in the face of the
four freedoms “continued to nurse four fears – of French imperialism, British insincerity,
American isolationism, and Zionist expansionism.”22 As the war neared its end, U.S.
observers pointed out the need to uphold U.S. legitimacy and goodwill. Wadsworth
articulated this in terms of the Atlantic Charter, arguing for U.S. support of Syria and
Lebanon against French pressure since if they “cannot secure entire freedom, then the
Atlantic Charter would be belied,” along with U.S. credibility.23 The State Department’s
Near Eastern Affairs division noted in November 1945 that the United States needed to
support Syria against France in order to uphold “the faith of small nations in the Atlantic
Charter.”24
Philippine leaders articulated the need for U.S. legitimacy most strikingly.
Joaquin Elizalde used proto-Third Worldist language, critiquing U.S. propaganda which
claimed that the Second World War pitted four-fifths of the world (the United Nations)
against one-fifth (the Axis). In fact, he said, the colonized world comprised the three-
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fifths over which the other two-fifths fought. He articulated the dilemma for colonized
peoples in terms equally applicable to Third World, neutralist rhetoric during the Cold
War: “Truly, the choice that is offered Asia today is an unhappy one. That great continent
must decide between supporting an archaic system of imperialism or accepting a cruel
future of…exploitation.” As Cold Warriors in the Third World would do a decade later,
Elizalde found solace in the nativist “oriental philosophies” which rejected Nazism – as
tradition and religion would be cited against communism in the 1950s. Elizalde called on
the United Nations not merely to vilify Japan or Nazism, but to project a positive
program of liberation which would rally the colonized people of Asia to their cause. As
U.S. leaders recognized during the Cold War, “we must beware not to turn [the common
people of Asia] into our foes.”25 Elizalde offered this alternative under the headline of a
modified Atlantic Charter.
Carlos Romulo, who served as the independent Philippine Republic’s public face
at the United Nations and in the United States through the 1950s, evoked the Atlantic
Charter throughout the period. Romulo saw the idealism of the Atlantic Charter, within
which he enfolded Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, as a powerful asset to support an image
of U.S. anticolonialism. Romulo sought to appropriate the Charter to improve the U.S.
reputation in the colonial and postcolonial world.26 He had commenced this rhetoric with
his pro-American Mother America, published in 1943, extolled the potential positive
influence of the United States, centered on its idealism expressed in the Atlantic Charter.
However, he also warned about the need to prevent the alienation of those he called “the
one billion betrayed,” who “had been fought over and shuffled about in the white man’s
Elizalde, “The Meaning of a Pacific Charter,” 84–85.
Carlos P. Romulo, “Asia Must Be Seen Through Asian Eyes,” The New York Times Magazine,
September 3, 1950; “Romulo Wants Asian Charter,” New York Times, May 31, 1954.
25
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scramble for colonies, and nothing had come of their tragic struggles to throw off the
domination of their white masters.”27 Romulo implied that unless the United States lived
up to its anticolonial rhetoric, these “betrayed” would turn to Japan – as they might turn
to the Soviet Union after the defeat of the Axis.
Romulo also provides a link to another key aspect of the Cold War and
decolonization discourse: human rights. The historiography devoted to the Atlantic
Charter has focused on its relationship to human rights, but only recently have historians
begun to connect human rights with decolonization. Roland Burke’s recent work has
shown the deep connection between the two concepts for intellectuals and policymakers
from the Third World – notably figures like Romulo, an author of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and leaders from Syria. Syrian Foreign Minister Khoury
alluded to this by emphasizing the need for the United Nations Charter to reference the
Atlantic Charter.28 Even more tellingly, in one of the first speeches at the Human Rights
Commission under the auspices of the United Nations Organization, the Syrian delegate
made a lengthy speech referencing the Atlantic Charter. This speech identified selfdetermination as “the cornerstone of the whole edifice of human rights,” invoking “the
1941 Atlantic Charter at length” to demonstrate the link between domestic selfdetermination (democracy) and external self-determination (sovereignty).29
In these linkages we see the importance of the Atlantic Charter.
Historiographically, the Charter provides a useful transition point between known and
well-documented global narratives: the efflorescence of nationalist movements in the
interwar period, and the explosion of anticolonial nationalism as the “Third World” in the
27
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postwar period. Unlike the narrative of human rights, wherein numerous authors have
examined the link between interwar and postwar rights ideas and regimes, historians lack
a history of self-determination and global anticolonialism that bridges the 1920s with the
1950s.30 In fact, Vijay Prasad’s recent history of the Third World omits the war entirely,
skipping from Brussels in the 1920s to Bandung in the 1950s.31 Anticolonial use of the
Atlantic Charter helps provide the link between global anticolonialism in the early- and
mid-Twentieth Century. Moreover, as this conclusion has attempted to show, new
frontiers for exploring its transnational mobilization and its links to the postwar world
order may prove fruitful.
In all these ways, though, the Charter’s significance resulted not from its
interpretation by Roosevelt or Churchill. Instead, the anticolonial activists who used it
demanded more from the Charter than policymakers in the Euro-American powers had
intended to concede. Even the most pliant among the colonial leaders, the Philippine
Commonwealth, envisioned imminent global decolonization out of the Charter, far
beyond what Roosevelt had in mind or Churchill considered acceptable. Whether
encapsulating revulsion with European duplicity or serving as a higher authority to call
upon in the face of repression, anticolonial writers and speakers used the global rhetoric
of the Charter for local purposes. Rather than guiding the undifferentiated, “broad, toiling
masses of all the continents” that Churchill envisioned among the darker peoples, various
people among those masses rose up, seized the Charter, and claimed it for themselves.
They, not Euro-American policymakers, elevated the Atlantic Charter from a press
release to a political tool.
Cf. Simpson, “The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination,” 676–677.
Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: The New Press,
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